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Over the Borderline—A Review of Margaret Price’s 
Mad at School: Rhetorics of Mental Disability and 
Academic Life 
Gregory M. Duhl* 
This Article is about “madness” in higher education.  In Mad at 
School: Rhetorics of Mental Disability and Academic Life, Professor 
Margaret Price analyzes the rhetoric and discourse surrounding mental 
disabilities in academia.  In this Article, I place Price’s work in a legal 
context, discussing why the Americans with Disabilities Act fails those 
with mental illness and why reform is needed to protect them.  My own 
narrative as a law professor with Borderline Personality Disorder 
frames my critique.  Narratives of mental illness are important because 
they help connect those who are often stigmatized and isolated due to 
mental illness and provide a framework for them to overcome barriers 
limiting their equal participation in academic life. 
INTRODUCTION 
In Mad at School: Rhetorics of Mental Disability and Academic 
Life,1 Margaret Price writes about academics (i.e., students, staff, 
faculty, and administrators) who are “mad” in higher education.2  
Despite often burying her readers in rhetorical theory, Price offers a 
 
* Associate Professor of Law, William Mitchell College of Law.  I thank Jim Hilbert and 
Jaclyn Millner who often go to great lengths to prevent me from going “mad” or “losing my 
mind.”  I also thank my friends and family who have helped me behind the scenes.  You know 
who you are. 
1. MARGARET PRICE, MAD AT SCHOOL: RHETORICS OF MENTAL DISABILITY AND ACADEMIC 
LIFE (2011). 
2. Price states that: 
Mad is a term generally used in non-U.S. contexts, and has a long history of positive 
and person-centered discourses.  MindFreedom International, a coalition of grassroots 
organizations, traces the beginning of the “Mad Movement” to the early 1970s, and 
reports on “Mad Pride” events that continue to take place in countries including 
Australia, Ghana, Canada, England, and the United States . . . .   
. . . . 
. . . As with queer, the broad scope of mad carries the drawback of generality but also 
the power of mass. 
Id. at 10. 
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refreshing discussion of mental disability in academic life, inviting a 
dialogue that has long been missing in legal education.  In focusing on 
the rhetoric and discourse surrounding mental illness, Price departs 
from traditional legal and medical analyses of the rights of the mentally 
ill and “cures” for mental illness.3  In doing so, she offers a blueprint for 
increased understanding and acceptance of, and participation by, those 
who are “mad” in legal education. 
I am “mad.”  As a law professor, students, staff, and faculty 
colleagues often have called me a “mad genius,” with the usual 
connotations that the label suggests—“brilliant,” “eccentric,” 
“unorthodox,” “creative,” and “inspiring.”4 At the same time, my 
students tell me if my socks do not match or my shirt is only half tucked 
into my jeans.5  I certainly get “mad” or “angry,” which is more 
scientifically defined as feeling “inappropriate, intense anger or 
[having] difficulty controlling anger.”6  Quite literally, I have often 
been “mad” at “school”—the school at which I am studying or working.  
Lastly, while I usually do not refer to myself in this way, I am “mad” in 
the sense that I am mentally ill; oscillating like a yo-yo, I regularly 
experience periods of mania, irritability, insomnia, anxiety, and 
depression, often all in the same day.  Even if, rhetorically, medicine 
and science cannot define a “normal” mind, symptomatically, I do not 
feel “normal.” 
To the best of my knowledge, I now join only two other law 
professors who have written narratives about how their own chronic 
 
3. Price describes this rhetoric: 
Th[e] well/unwell paradigm has many problems, particularly its implication that a mad 
person needs to be “cured” by some means.  One material consequence of this view is 
that mental health insurance operates on a “cure” basis, demanding “progress” reports 
from therapists and social workers, and cutting off coverage when the patient is 
deemed to have achieved a sufficiently “well” state. 
Id. at 12. 
4. Cf. id. at 2 (“That film [A Beautiful Mind] upholds a truism about mental illness, namely, its 
link to creative genius. . . .  The commonsense link between madness and genius arises again and 
again, in stories about real people like composer Robert Schumann, who is said to have been 
bipolar . . . .”); id. at 16 (“In her ‘bipolar book,’ . . . A Mind Apart, Susanne Antonetta argues that 
neurodiversity acts as a positive force in human evolution, enabling alternative and creative ways 
of thinking, knowing, and apprehending the world.”).  I have also been “diagnosed” (or 
misdiagnosed) repeatedly with Bipolar Disorder II.  See infra Part I (discussing my struggle to 
ascertain a diagnosis for my mental illness). 
5. See id. at 2 (“Faculty members who display ‘quirky’ behavior are sometimes regarded with 
affection: think of funny Professor X, who mumbles in the hallways and perhaps wears 
outlandish outfits.”). 
6. AM. PSYCHIATRIC ASS’N, DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL MANUAL OF MENTAL 
DISORDERS § 301.83, at 710 (4th ed. rev. 2000) [hereinafter DSM-IV-TR]. 
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mental illness affects their participation in academic life.7  I have 
Borderline Personality Disorder (“BPD”), a condition “in which people 
have long-term patterns of unstable or turbulent emotions, such as 
feelings about themselves and others.  These inner experiences often 
cause them to take impulsive actions and have chaotic relationships.”8  
My reality is defined by black-or-white, right-or-wrong, and good-or-
bad thinking, although I do not dissociate or live on the border of 
psychosis and neurosis.9  For that reason, “borderline” is an unfortunate 
name for this personality disorder and an example, in Price’s words, of 
how “persons with mental disabilities are presumed not to be 
competent, nor understandable, nor valuable, nor whole.”10 
While mental health professionals commonly believe that “clinicians 
should help people with borderline personality disorder to avoid black-
and-white thinking, such as right/wrong, good/bad, and all-or-nothing 
styles of thinking,”11 this belief presumes that the “borderline” mind is 
unsound or abnormal and that medicine and science can objectively 
 
7. See generally JAMES T.R. JONES, A HIDDEN MADNESS (2011) (describing his decades-long 
struggle with bipolar disorder); James T.R. Jones, Walking the Tightrope of Bipolar Disorder: 
The Secret Life of a Law Professor, 57 J. LEGAL EDUC. 349 (2007) (same); ELYN R. SAKS, THE 
CENTER CANNOT HOLD: MY JOURNEY THROUGH MADNESS (2007) (chronicling her struggles 
with schizophrenia); cf. PRICE, supra note 1, at 130 (“[O]ne study of U.S. law schools reveals that 
just over 1 percent of their faculty were reported as having disabilities . . . [and] [s]pecific 
information on faculty with mental disabilities is even more scarce.”). 
8. PubMed Health, Borderline Personality Disorder, U.S. NAT’L LIBRARY OF MED. (Nov. 15, 
2010), http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmedhealth/PMH0001931/. 
9. Rather than being labeled as a psychotic disorder, BPD is instead recognized as a disorder 
characterized by intense emotional experiences and behavior and instability in relationships.  
JOHN G. GUNDERSON & PAUL S. LINKS, BORDERLINE PERSONALITY DISORDER: A CLINICAL 
GUIDE 2, 13–14 (2008).  See Anneli Rufus, The Uncertainty Curse, PSYCHOL. TODAY (Mar. 28, 
2011), http://www.psychologytoday.com/blog/stuck/201103/the-uncertainty-curse (describing a 
mother’s struggle with BPD).  Rufus notes: 
I’ve come to believe she had Borderline Personality Disorder, a condition whose 
characteristics—identity issues, self-loathing, negativity, black-and-white thinking, and 
a sense of emptiness inside—describe her perfectly and tragically.  It’s arguably the 
most misleadingly named disorder in the DSM, because one wastes a lot of time 
wondering: the borderline between what and what?  Originally it was neurosis and 
psychosis.  Later that distinction was retired.  This disorder needs a clear new name. 
Id.  
10. PRICE, supra note 1, at 26.  Some commentators also assign blame for BPD’s bad rap to 
mental health professionals who haphazardly diagnose the condition.  See Jerold Kreisman, 
Society’s Changing View of Borderline Personality, PSYCHOL. TODAY (Nov. 25, 2012), 
http://www.psychologytoday.com/blog/i-hate-you-dont-leave-me/201211/societys-changing-
view-borderline-personality (discussing that when BPD first appeared in the DSM, “most 
professionals viewed it as a diagnosis bestowed on difficult, unremitting, pain-in-the-ass 
patients”). 
11. See, e.g., RICHARD K. RIES ET AL., ASSESSMENT AND TREATMENT OF PATIENTS WITH 
COEXISTING MENTAL ILLNESS AND ALCOHOL AND OTHER DRUG ABUSE: TREATMENT 
IMPROVEMENT PROTOCOL (TIP) SERIES 9, at 57 (1994). 
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define the “normal” mind.  As Price notes, “such [disordered] minds 
show up all the time, in obvious and not-so-obvious ways[,] . . . [and] 
recognizing their appearance is not a yes-no proposition, but rather a 
confusing and contextually dependent process that calls into question 
what we mean by the ‘normal’ mind.”12  The array of diagnoses in the 
Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM) is “so 
copious that [the DSM] seems to suggest that ‘human life is a form of 
mental illness.’”13 
I have chosen to use the power of my own personal experiences with 
mental illness—placed within the context of Price’s work—to fight the 
stigma of mental illness and to begin to overturn the barriers that 
mentally ill academics encounter in legal education.  When I have tried 
to write analytically about mental illness in higher education, the 
writing has been forced, clinical, and devoid of the intense emotions 
that this issue invokes.14  Even if such analytical writing, with a thesis-
driven academic argument, is more “coherent,” I wonder, as Price does, 
if the “demonstration of coherence indicate[s] a stronger mind.”15  The 
medical paradigm is incoherent in that it presumes an “objective, 
benign, and stable authority,”16 which is often not the case, as 
evidenced by numerous and conflicting mental diagnoses I have 
received over the last twenty years.17  Furthermore, medicine has 
trouble grappling with academics who are professionally hyper-
functional but emotionally dysfunctional—therapists, as well as 
colleagues and administrators, have often minimized the gravity of my 
symptoms because I am “high functioning.”18  The legal paradigm is 
not much better because even with the Americans with Disabilities Act, 
courts and commentators have struggled for over twenty years with how 
to fit employees with “mental disabilities” into the Act’s framework.19 
 
12. PRICE, supra note 1, at 3−4. 
13. Id. at 3 (quoting Lawrence J. Davis, The Encyclopedia of Insanity, HARPER’S MAG., Feb. 
1997, at 61). 
14. See id. at 31−32 (“It would seem . . . that reason and emotion reside together quite 
comfortably, and hence, that there is ample space to theorize rhetoricity for those with mental 
disabilities.”). 
15. Id. at 6. 
16. Id. at 36−37. 
17. See infra Part I (discussing the various diagnoses I have received throughout my struggle 
with mental illness). 
18. See Anita L. Allen, Mental Disorders and the “System of Judgmental Responsibility,” 90 
B.U. L. REV. 621, 623 (2010) (“The group affected by mental disorders includes the high 
functioning professionals we rely on[,] . . . including lawyers, judges, physicians and  
politicians . . . .”). 
19. See, e.g., James Concannon, Mind Matters: Mental Disability and the History and Future 
of the Americans with Disabilities Act, 36 LAW & PSYCHOL. REV. 89, 107 (2012) (“Although 
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Rather than writing as an “insider”—a “straight, white, educated, 
male American citizen”20—analyzing “who is mentally disabled . . . and 
what we do once we have decided a person should be labeled as 
such,”21 I write this narrative as an “outsider” looking in at the 
misassumptions of the “normal-minded” in legal education about 
academics with mental illness.22 Traditional critiques of “outsider” 
narratives are that they do not “fit into the legal framework of verifiable 
 
individuals with mental impairments were not failing to establish protected-class status more than 
plaintiffs with physical impairments, such plaintiffs were still losing at an alarming rate pre-
Amendments Act.”); Michelle Parikh, Note, Burning the Candles at Both Ends, and There Is 
Nothing Left for Proof: The Americans with Disabilities Act’s Disservice to Persons with Mental 
Illness, 89 CORNELL L. REV. 721, 745 (2004).  In her Note, Parikh describes the framework 
within the Act: 
The incompatibility of the disability definition with mental illness . . . has played out 
quite starkly in recent case law.  The two main shortcomings of the ADA’s treatment 
of mental illness are borne out in the case law of the lower federal courts.  By and 
large, mentally ill individuals who attempt to gain protection under the ADA are 
unsuccessful.  On a conceptual level, it is difficult for individuals who are mentally ill 
and in the workforce to juggle the dual requirements of disability and qualified 
individual status.  An individual who clearly suffers from a mental illness that has a 
detrimental effect on her work functioning may look to the statute for a safe haven.  
What she finds instead are formalistic, rigid requirements, which incur more 
qualifications and caveats with each Supreme Court decision.  What the ADA drafters 
intended to be an individualized, case-by-case inquiry has turned into a series of 
obstacles and hoops, as individuals attempt to translate the complexities of their 
experiences into the “buzzwords” of the courts’ opinions. 
Id. (footnotes omitted).  See also infra Part III.A (discussing the role of misconceived rhetoric in 
stigmatizing mental illness). 
20. Carolyn Grose, A Field Trip to Benetton . . . and Beyond: Some Thoughts on “Outsider 
Narrative” in a Law School Clinic, 4 CLINICAL L. REV. 109, 110 n.4 (1997).  Grose defines an 
“outsider” as “someone who does not have access to the channels of power and communication in 
this society.  Practically speaking . . . this means someone who is female, of color, lesbian, gay, 
bisexual, undereducated, low-income, poor, disabled, undocumented, non-English speaking, etc.”  
Id. at 110. 
21. PRICE, supra note 1, at 2. 
22. See Marc A. Fajer, Authority, Credibility, and Pre-Understanding: A Defense of Outsider 
Narratives in Legal Scholarship, 82 GEO. L.J. 1845, 1854 (1994).  In describing the perspectives, 
Fajer notes: 
We can tell stories about ourselves, not so much to show how we are representative of 
our group, but how the society makes essentializing assumptions about us because of 
the groups to which we belong.  These stories do not purport to show that all members 
of the group behave a certain way.  Instead, they demonstrate that people commonly 
believe members of a group behave in specific ways and they show that some portion 
of the group does not conform to the stereotype or at least that the relationship between 
the stereotype and reality is complex. 
Id.  See also Paul Gewirtz, Narrative and Rhetoric in the Law, in LAW’S STORIES: NARRATIVE 
AND RHETORIC IN LAW 2, 13 (Peter Brooks & Paul Gewirtz eds., 1996) (describing “outsider” 
jurisprudence or the “turn to narrative” as a “clear offshoot of the further loss of faith in the idea 
of objective truth and the widespread embrace of ideas about the social construction of reality”); 
Grose, supra note 20, at 114 n.17 (citing sources).  
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truths that creates new legal principles,”23 but this position presupposes, 
in my case, that there is an objective truth about mental diagnoses and 
mental illness, which there is not.  As Jane Baron notes, 
[T]he notion that storytellers must justify departures from “the rules” 
of mainstream scholarship “as they exist,” as well as from the 
“ordinary understanding” or the “conventional standard” of truth . . . 
[is] precisely what many storytellers dispute, namely, that mainstream, 
ordinary, and conventional standards are just “there” and themselves 
already justified.24 
In other words, the supposed objective truth about mental illness is no 
more valuable than my firsthand experience with mental illness in 
academia.  Without any scientific, objective meaning of the “normal” 
mind, narratives matter. 
Price gives further warning about the use of mental illness narratives. 
She cautions that “such narratives often reify the dominant script of 
disability as an individual tragedy (and potential source of triumph 
when ‘overcome’).”25  She calls for academics with mental disabilities 
to be heard and respected, “not in spite of [their] mental disabilities, but 
with and through them.”26  We do not need more feel-good stories 
 
23. Grose, supra note 20, at 116.  See Kathryn Abrams, Hearing the Call of Stories, 79 CAL. 
L. REV. 971, 978 (1991) (noting that contrary to the author’s stated intentions, “[the story] does 
not help [readers] think about ameliorative legal reforms. . . .  The experience conveyed by the 
narrative does not seem to translate automatically into a new rule; and the narrative scholarship 
seems to provide no ‘normative framework’ for achieving that translation”); Mark Tushnet, The 
Degradation of Constitutional Discourse, 81 GEO. L.J. 251, 252−60 (1992) (arguing that 
“outsider” narrative, with its focus on individual experience, does not relate well to general legal 
principles). 
24. Jane B. Baron, Resistance to Stories, 67 S. CAL. L. REV. 255, 256 (1994) (footnotes 
omitted). 
25. PRICE, supra note 1, at 178. 
26. Id. at 8.  Unfortunately, Professor Jones’s narrative falls subject to this criticism: 
I want to demonstrate that those with mental illness can have full and satisfying 
professional and personal lives, and they need and should not endure stigma or doubt 
as to their ability to perform their personal or employment duties.  I show this by 
pointing out that someone who has a severe bipolar disorder can graduate with high 
honors from an elite college preparatory school; earn Phi Beta Kappa at a prestigious 
college (graduating with highest distinction) and the Order of the Coif at a top law 
school (graduating with distinction), where he served on law review and finished 
second in his class; work successfully at a Wall Street law firm; clerk for two federal 
judges; be a finalist for a clerkship with the Chief Justice of the United States; practice 
law as a member of the United States Supreme Court and Florida Bars; teach at the 
University of Chicago Law School; marry successfully; earn tenure and full professor 
status by teaching, service, and publication at a law school where no one knew I have a 
severe mental illness; and become a nationally known expert on an important social 
issue.  If that message gets across, and as a result someone is encouraged to reach for 
everything in life despite having a mental disease, this article was worth writing and 
my “secret” was worth disclosing.  
Jones, Walking the Tightrope of Bipolar Disorder, supra note 7, at 373 (emphasis added). 
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about those who have succeeded despite a mental illness.27  I try to 
write the “counter-diagnosis” that Price calls for in Mad at School.28  
My mind is, objectively, neither sound nor unsound, but it is the source 
of my greatest assets and my greatest deficits in academia.29  To “cure” 
my mind, using the medical paradigm, is to zap me of all of my 
strengths. 
In Part I of this Article, I describe my own experiences with the 
mental health system, as well as how mental illness has affected me in 
law school, as a lawyer, and most importantly, as a law professor.  In 
Part II, I use my own narrative as a lens to analyze Price’s discussion of 
the rhetoric of mental illness in higher education.  I start with how the 
law interacts with mental illness, use that interaction to criticize Price’s 
damaging label of “mental disability,” and discuss her analysis of 
teaching and learning, collegiality, and productivity.  Part III concludes 
with a discussion of how we should frame the discourse about mental 
illness in legal education.  Rhetoric matters, but law, medicine, and 
narrative matter as well. 
I. MY STORY 
Price notes the “proliferation of stories” about mental illness as proof  
“of two important truths about disorderly minds.  First, such minds 
show up all the time, in obvious and not-so-obvious ways; and second, 
recognizing their appearance is not a yes-no proposition, but rather a 
confusing and contextually dependent process that calls into question 
what we mean by the ‘normal’ mind.”30   
I have experienced these truths firsthand, and now I share my story. 
A close friend, with no formal training in psychology or psychiatry, 
recently diagnosed me with Borderline Personality Disorder (“BPD”),31 
 
27. See PRICE, supra note 1, at 104 (“I found the references to courage and heroics disturbing, 
though not surprising; here was the familiar overcoming narrative, rehearsed yet again.”). 
28. Id. at 176−77. 
29. Cf. Andrea Sachs, A Memoir of Schizophrenia, TIME (Aug. 27, 2007), http://www.time. 
com/time/arts/article/0,8599,1656592,00.html (“‘My mind has been both my best friend and my 
worst enemy,’ says [author] Elyn Saks . . . .”).  
30. PRICE, supra note 1, at 3−4. 
31. The criteria for BPD is as follows: 
A pervasive pattern of instability of interpersonal relationships, self-image, and affects, 
and marked impulsivity beginning by early adulthood and present in a variety of 
contexts, as indicated by five (or more) of the following:  
1. Frantic efforts to avoid real or imagined abandonment. Note: Do not include 
suicidal or self-mutilating behavior covered in Criterion 5. 
2. A pattern of unstable and intense interpersonal relationships characterized by 
alternating between extremes of idealization and devaluation.  
3. Identity disturbance: markedly and persistently unstable self-image or sense of 
5_DUHL 3/9/2013  1:35 PM 
778 Loyola University Chicago Law Journal [Vol.  44 
after psychologists and psychiatrists had diagnosed me at various times 
over the last twenty years with Dysthymia, Major Depressive Disorder, 
Generalized Anxiety Disorder, Panic Disorder, Bipolar Disorder, 
Narcissistic Personality Disorder, Dependent Personality Disorder, 
Antisocial Personality Disorder, Attention Deficit Disorder (ADD), and 
Attention Deficit Hyperactivity Disorder (ADHD).32  While I perhaps 
had symptoms of some of these mental “disorders,” I felt as if I was not 
being heard, as none of the diagnoses captured how my illness affected 
me in the same way as my diagnosis of BPD.  For example, a resident in 
the mood disorders clinic at one of the largest U.S. research hospitals 
continually asked me during an evaluation to define my last “manic” 
episode that lasted at least a couple of weeks.  I became frustrated that I 
could not do so.  Nonetheless, the resident and attending psychiatrist 
diagnosed me with Bipolar Disorder.  When I later spoke to a 
psychologist about treatment for BPD, she told me that I was mistaken 
about my diagnosis because I was too “bright” to have BPD. 
I finally found a psychologist who listened to me, although ironically 
she was an unlicensed psychologist who was practicing under her 
supervisor’s license.  Once I had a diagnosis from my psychologist, I 
also found a psychiatrist who established that I had BPD.  While I agree 
 
self.  
4. Impulsivity in at least two areas that are potentially self-damaging (e.g., 
spending, sex, substance abuse, reckless driving, binge eating). Note: Do not 
include suicidal or self-mutilating behavior covered in Criterion.  
5. Recurrent suicidal behavior, gestures, or threats, or self-mutilating behavior.  
6. Affective instability due to a marked reactivity of mood (e.g., intense episodic 
dysphoria, irritability, or anxiety usually lasting a few hours and only rarely more 
than a few days).  
7. Chronic feelings of emptiness.  
8. Inappropriate, intense anger or difficulty controlling anger (e.g., frequent 
displays of temper, constant anger, recurrent physical fights).  
9. Transient, stress-related paranoid ideation or severe dissociative symptoms. 
DSM-IV-TR, supra note 6, § 301.83, at 710 (emphases omitted). 
32. The diagnosis of mental disorders is very complex and imprecise.  Authors Moses and 
Barlow have articulated a reason for this: 
Possible explanations for these high levels of comorbidity have been reviewed 
extensively and include overlapping definitional criteria, varying base rates of 
occurrence in different study settings, and a possible sequential relationship among the 
disorders such that features of one disorder serve as risk factors for another.  Another 
possible explanation for this comorbidity is the presence of a “negative affect 
syndrome (NAS).”  The collective symptoms of emotional disorders have been 
theorized as merely variable responses emerging from a more fundamental disorder. 
Erica B. Moses & David H. Barlow, A New Unified Treatment Approach for Emotional 
Disorders Based on Emotion Science, 15 CURRENT DIRECTIONS IN PSYCHOL. SCI. 146, 147 
(2006) (internal citations omitted).  See, e.g., DSM-IV-TR, supra note 6, at 429–84 (discussing the 
symptoms and diagnoses of anxiety disorders, including, for example, Generalized Anxiety 
Disorder and Panic Disorder).  
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with one commentator that “the DSM-IV is a book of dogma,”33 which 
had failed me for twenty years, I am a casebook study for the symptoms 
of BPD.  The DSM, while giving my illness a name and thus helping me 
feel less isolated and more connected to “patients” who share this 
disorder, stigmatizes me by labeling my diagnosis as a “personality 
disorder”—a personal indictment of who I am.34  BPD is an Axis II 
diagnosis, which is considered “less treatable and insurable” than 
disorders with an Axis I diagnosis, such as depression, bipolarism, and 
schizophrenia.35 
To offer some context to my review of Price’s book, I share some of 
my experiences with mental illness as a law student, as a lawyer, and as 
a law professor. 
A. Law School 
I began at Harvard Law School in the fall of 1992 after graduating 
from Yale College in 1991 and spending a year abroad teaching at a 
private boys’ boarding school in Sydney, Australia.  While I 
experienced some depression during college and in Australia, I started 
at Harvard unaware of my emotional limitations. 
Near the middle of my first year, I became disillusioned with my 
experience at Harvard Law School.  That was not atypical,36 especially 
 
33. L.J. Davis, The Encyclopedia of Insanity, HARPER’S MAG., Feb. 1997, at 62 (emphasis 
omitted). 
34.  Elise Stobbe articulates this stigmatization: 
There may be no other psychiatric diagnosis more laden with stereotypes and stigma 
than Borderline Personality Disorder.  People who live with this label—the majority 
being female—often have problems accessing good mental health services.  Unlike the 
stigmatization that society puts on mental illness, the stigma associated with BPD often 
comes from mental health professionals and their patronizing attitudes.  Many 
psychiatrists will not treat BPD patients, or they may limit the number of BPD patients 
in their practice or drop them as “treatment resistant.”  Often attempts to treat 
borderlines fail, and some professionals blame the patient for not responding to 
treatment.  It is often undiagnosed, misdiagnosed, or treated inappropriately.  
Elise Stobbe, Psychiatry Discriminates against People with Borderline Personality Disorder, 
BRAINBLOGGER.COM  (June 20, 2006), http://brainblogger.com/2006/06/20/anti-stigmatization-
psychiatry-discriminates-against-people-with-borderline-personality-disorder/ (internal citations 
omitted). 
35. What Is an Axis II Disorder?, BPDCENTRAL.COM, http://www.bpdcentral.com/faq/ 
personality-disorders (last visited July 19, 2012).  
36. Two authors have described the feelings they experienced while attending Harvard.  First, 
Covington and Burling partner Peter Barton Hutt writes: 
I remember long talks late at night venting my frustration and arguing about how law 
should really be taught to make it interesting and even exciting.  I left Harvard Law 
School feeling unfulfilled, unsuccessful, and alienated.  Nonetheless, those vivid 
memories did more to entice me to consider teaching food and drug law at Harvard 
than to discourage me.  I was intrigued by the challenge of trying to teach law the way 
I felt it should have been taught when I was there. 
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before Elena Kagan became dean.37  Most first-year classes were large, 
with about 135 students, and as a result, I became alienated from my 
classmates, the faculty, and the institution.  I still remember the first 
question on Duncan Kennedy’s torts exam.  This question was the one 
he called the “bullshit question”: “Discuss some issue we studied over 
the course of the semester.”  I thought that much of my first year of 
legal education at Harvard was “bullshit.” 
During the second semester of my second year, I took the late Phil 
Areeda’s antitrust class.  Professor Areeda was a “master of the Socratic 
method.”38  On one of the first days of class, as I was trembling in my 
chair, he called on me.  I had no idea what the answer to his question 
was, and he compassionately moved on to another student.  Afterward, I 
panicked at the thought of going back to his class again—I stopped 
going to it, along with the rest of my classes that semester.  I became 
too depressed to get out of bed except to make my daily trek to Harvard 
Square to have a chocolate milkshake at Herrell’s Ice Cream.  I did not 
think I would finish law school. 
I did make it back for my third year.  But on the mornings of exams, I 
would often feign physical illness because I was too scared to take 
them.  I finally went to a school psychiatrist who arranged for me to 
take my exams in a quiet, separate room, which was actually the make-
up room for other students writing exams.  He referred me to a therapist 
because Harvard Law could not provide the “type” of therapy that I 
 
Peter Barton Hutt, Food and Drug Law: Journal of an Academic Adventure, 46 J. LEGAL EDUC. 
1, 1−2 (1996).  Furthermore, Kevin Washburn states: 
For most of the past fifty years, attending Harvard Law School was a miserable 
experience for the majority of its students.  The tremendous jubilation on acceptance 
quickly soured after students arrived on campus.  While some students took the 
Harvard experience in stride, recognizing it as the price of admission to the school they 
had first learned about in The Paper Chase or One L, many became unhappy during the 
first year and stayed that way through the rest of their law school careers.  To be sure, 
students appreciated the tremendous opportunities that a Harvard law degree provided, 
but many were alienated not only from the institution, but even their own classmates, 
during their time at the law school.  This alienation often continued long after law 
school.  To meet a recent Harvard Law grad was sometimes to meet an embittered 
person who vowed never to give a dime to the institution. 
Kevin K. Washburn, Elena Kagan and the Miracle at Harvard, 61 J. LEGAL EDUC. 67, 67 (2011). 
37. See Washburn, supra note 36, at 70−73 (discussing how Kagan transformed the first-year 
sections and first-year orientation).  After her time as Dean of Harvard Law School, Kagan 
became the 45th Solicitor General of the United States, and subsequently, the 100th Associate 
Justice of the Supreme Court of the United States.  
38. See Clark Byse, In Memoriam: Phillip E. Areeda, 109 HARV. L. REV. 889, 896−97 (1996) 
(“[Areeda] was a master of the Socratic method. . . . The essence of [his] approach in teaching . . . 
produced tension and anxiety [that eventually evolved into gratitude] for ‘a rigorous and yet 
understanding style of teaching.’” (internal quotation marks omitted)).  I never got over the 
“tension and anxiety” from Areeda’s teaching. 
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needed.  I wondered at the time, and still wonder now, what that “type” 
of therapy was. 
One day, I was assigned to be “on call” in my corporations class 
during my third year.  The thought of having to perform in front of over 
100 students terrified me.  The professor’s secretary told me that I could 
be excused if I had a doctor’s note.  I got one, and with notes and made-
up illnesses, I “managed” my mental health while at Harvard Law.  I 
graduated in 1995, but skipped my graduation because I was 
disillusioned and alienated by my law school experience. 
B. Practicing Law 
Between 1995 and 2002, I worked at several different law firms in 
either tax or intellectual property litigation.  I also spent two years 
trying to start my own firm.  My tenure at various firms lasted between 
six days (my first job out of law school) to eighteen months.  I quit jobs 
because of some combination of depression, irritability, anxiety, and 
boredom.  I was fired from one job because I “resisted” the law firm 
hierarchy.  I was always able to get my next job without much ado 
about why I left the previous job.  I repeatedly made an “impulsive” 
decision and took the “next” job offered.  I consistently thought the 
problem was with the firms and not with me.  At every firm where I 
worked, I felt empty and alienated—I found no meaning in the work, 
was bored with its tediousness, and did not like the firms’ hierarchical 
and undemocratic structures.39 
 
39. My experience was not atypical.  Other authors have similarly addressed this type of 
alienation: 
Many scholars have commented on the extensive alienation that lawyers experience, 
particularly within large law firms.  Such alienation can contribute to high levels of 
stress and job dissatisfaction.  Indeed, many lawyers lament that the practice of law is 
merely a business and that the atmosphere of law firm practice is bureaucratically 
stifling, leaving many lawyers chronically unfulfilled and discontented.  Much of the 
alienation that lawyers experience, particularly in larger law firms, stems from the 
“proletarian-like” conditions that operate within these firms. 
Robert Granfield, The Meaning of Pro Bono: Institutional Variations in Professional Obligations 
among Lawyers, 41 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 113, 134 (2007) (citations omitted).  Furthermore, 
authors Rustad and Koenig comment on the “legal hierarchy”:  
Hierarchy remains a significant variable in predicting lawyer happiness for those 
excluded from elite law firms.  The sifting and sorting of law school applicants into the 
different branches of the law is often an arbitrary and inefficient process.  MacLeish 
suffered existential anxiety because the formalism of law practice stifled his creativity, 
just as Stefancic and Delgado’s example of a contemporary law firm associate who 
suffers from alienation, wondering “Whatever Happened to That English Major I Used 
to Be?” 
Michael L. Rustad  & Thomas H. Koenig, A Hard Day’s Night: Hierarchy, History & Happiness 
in Legal Education, 58 SYRACUSE L. REV. 261, 314 (2008) (footnotes omitted). 
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I knew I could not survive in the legal profession and had reached a 
dead end.  I was deeply depressed.  For six weeks in December 2000 
and January 2001, I was hospitalized at the Menninger Clinic, then in 
Topeka, Kansas.  I participated in the Professionals in Crisis Program,40 
and for the first time, I felt like less of an “outsider.”  There were 
lawyers, doctors, businesspeople, and academics—educated men and 
women with high-paying jobs who had the same struggles with mood 
and personality disorders as me.  I attended career counseling while in 
the program, and the counselor, after administering a battery of tests, 
concluded that I should become a “deep sea diver.”  I ignored that 
advice, but realized that I had always loved teaching.  From that point, I 
decided to seek a career in which I could combine my passion for 
teaching with my background in law. 
C. Legal Education 
There is a “truism about mental illness, namely, its link to creative 
genius. . . .  The commonsense link between madness and genius arises 
again and again, in stories about real people like composer Robert 
Schumann, who is said to have been bipolar . . . .”41  Much scientific 
research suggests that there is a high correlation between creativity and 
mood and personality disorders, although the relationship between the 
two is complex (i.e., does mental illness cause creativity or does 
creativity cause mental illness?).42  In First-Rate Madness: Uncovering 
the Links Between Leadership and Mental Illness, a professor of 
 
40. See Professionals in Crisis Program, MENNINGER CLINIC, http://www.menningerclinic. 
com/patient-care/inpatient-treatment/professionals-in-crisis-program (last visited July 20, 2012). 
41. PRICE, supra note 1, at 2. 
42. See, e.g., Erika Lauronen et al., Links Between Creativity and Mental Disorder, 67 
PSYCHIATRY 81, 90–92 (2004) (discussing studies exploring correlations among creative groups, 
such as writers, and mental illness).  But see Charlotte Waddell, Creativity and Mental Illness: Is 
There a Link?, 43 CAN. J. PSYCHIATRY 166, 166–67 (1988) (“Creativity and mental illness have 
long been popularly associated.  Until recently, few studies have examined this purported 
association using scientific methods.  A spate of recent review articles, as well as memoirs of 
mental illness by prominent, creative individuals, have coincided with scientific interest in 
possible associations between creativity and mental illness.  These studies, reviews, and memoirs 
have garnered media attention and reinforced popular views that creativity and mental illness are 
positively associated. . . .  There is a long history of associating creativity and mental illness in 
western European cultures, starting with Aristotle, who equated insanity with genius, and 
culminating in the “mad genius” controversy of the last two centuries.  Many authors have 
described famous, creative individuals who reportedly had mental illnesses.  Recent accounts in 
popular media have touted a link between creativity and various forms of mental illness.  The 
popularity of asserting connections between creativity and mental illness has also been fueled by 
recent memoirs of mental illness by prominent gifted individuals. . . .  In summary, much recent 
psychiatric and popular literature has enthusiastically promoted an association between creativity 
and mental illness.  This enthusiasm, however, has not always been balanced with scientific 
evidence.” (internal citations omitted)). 
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psychiatry and pharmacology at Tufts Medical Center argues that “the 
mad” make the best leaders in times of crisis because of their creativity, 
resiliency, empathy, and realism.43  I strongly believe that my 
“abnormal” mind has led to much of my success as a law professor—
the same intense emotions with which I struggle fuel my passion, 
energy, and creativity.  My “mad” mind is not only a personal liability, 
but also a professional asset. 
D. Employment and Struggling for Success 
The faculty at Temple Law School’s James E. Beasley School of Law 
took a chance on me, and for two years I taught as an Honorable 
Abraham L. Freedman Teaching Fellow and earned my LL.M. in legal 
education.  After stops at the Southern Illinois University College of 
Law and the University of Tulsa College of Law, I was hired by 
William Mitchell College of Law, where I have been teaching for four-
and-a-half years.  This is the longest I have held any job—the previous 
record being two years.  I have become more self-aware and focused on 
my mental health since I started teaching at William Mitchell, which is 
largely why I have been able to maintain my current position. 
I regularly receive outstanding teaching evaluations (4.7 to 5.0 out of 
5.0 as overall scores), won the Teacher of the Year Award in my first 
year at William Mitchell, and have designed cutting-edge and creative 
transactional skills classes that combine negotiating and drafting, as 
well as a comprehensive pre-orientation workshop.  My students 
regularly call me “brilliant,” “a wizard,” “demanding,” 
“compassionate,” “realistic,” and “creative.”  I write scholarly articles in 
the areas of commercial law, legal ethics, and legal education, and I am 
coauthoring the second edition of a leading bankruptcy text.  I am the 
Associate Editor-in-Chief of The Business Lawyer, the flagship journal 
of the ABA Section of Business Law with a circulation of over 60,000 
subscribers.  I edit, cite-check, and proofread over 1200 book pages of 
manuscript annually.  I engage in significant internal service, including 
chairing our curriculum committee over the last two years, in which I 
spearheaded significant reform of the first-year and skills curricula. 
I do not want to belabor my success.  My only point is that I am 
successful because of my mental illness, not despite my illness.  At the 
same time, I face extraordinary struggles: frequent mood swings over 
the course of a day; feelings of emptiness, abandonment, and low self-
esteem; difficulties in interpersonal relationships; self-injurious 
 
43. NASSIR GHAEMI, A FIRST-RATE MADNESS: UNCOVERING THE LINKS BETWEEN 
LEADERSHIP AND MENTAL ILLNESS 17–18 (2011). 
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behaviors such as cutting and addictions; and even paranoia.  I describe 
some of these challenges below. 
1. Feelings of Abandonment and Emptiness and Difficulty in 
Interpersonal Relationships 
I spend much of my day in front of the computer responding to 
emails, often within minutes.  I write, edit, prepare for class, and 
communicate with colleagues using my laptop.  I am more comfortable 
in front of my computer than with face-to-face interactions.  When I do 
not get any emails for a period of time, I feel abandoned—lost, empty, 
and unaware of what to do.  I have low self-esteem even when a 
successful class or program ends.  I look for external sources of 
gratification when none exist.  The highs often become lows.  I focus on 
the failures in my life (e.g., the jobs I could not keep) rather than my 
successes as a law professor.  Mentors become villains, and villains 
become mentors.44  I have such a strong sense of “right” and “wrong” 
that people switch on me quickly.  I have found, however, that since 
entering academia, I am more loyal to those who are aware of my 
illness, and they are more loyal to me—hence, my willingness to share 
my narrative. 
2. Addiction 
Last year, I became addicted to benzodiazepines, which has happened 
numerous times since law school.  My mother had to hide my medicine 
from me when I was living at home in my twenties to prevent me from 
taking too much.  Last fall, I began waking up in the morning shaking 
and sweating, overwhelmed with all the work that I had to do.  By the 
second semester, the thought of teaching caused tremendous anxiety, 
despite the fact that I had taught Sales and Secured Transactions over a 
half-dozen times each.  I lost confidence in myself and no longer 
believed I could be a good teacher.  For the first few weeks of the 
semester, I either cancelled class or taught in a way that manifested my 
illness, “in forms ranging from ‘odd’ remarks to lack of eye contact to 
repetitious stimming.”45  Mental impairments are not truly “invisible,” 
 
44. John Cloud further explains this dichotomy: 
Borderline patients seem to have no internal governor; they are capable of deep love 
and profound rage almost simultaneously.  They are powerfully connected to the 
people close to them and terrified by the possibility of losing them—yet attack those 
people so unexpectedly that they often ensure the very abandonment they fear.  When 
they want to hold, they claw instead. 
John Cloud, The Mystery of Borderline Personality Disorder, TIME (Jan. 8, 2009), http://www. 
time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,1870491,00.html.  
45. PRICE, supra note 1, at 18. 
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although students ironically are likely to perceive that these behaviors 
are a function of eccentricities and not of any illness. 
I was already on 45 milligrams of Temazepam (a benzodiazepine) 
and 12.5 milligrams of Ambien CR (addictive, similar to 
benzodiazepines) when the psychiatric physician assistant I was seeing 
prescribed 0.5 to 1 milligram of Xanax to take “as needed.”  The pills 
provided instant relief—I thought I had found the “magic bullet”—a 
feeling that I have had repeatedly over the last twenty years each time I 
have tried a new medication.  However, I quickly had to take more and 
more pills to have the same effect, and I quickly began to use Xanax 
even on weekends to sleep and escape from my reality. 
Each time that I tried to cut back, I felt more and more anxious, not 
knowing whether these feelings stemmed from the original anxiety or 
rebound anxiety from not taking enough Xanax.  I often became 
confused, and my cognitive abilities seemed to slow.  I finally saw a 
new psychiatrist who told me that I had an addiction.  I had become 
impulsive in my use of anti-anxiety medications in an attempt to numb 
my reality.  Although at first she wanted to hospitalize me, she instead 
used a Valium taper to help me successfully get off all benzodiazepines 
(and the Ambien).  Ironically, at least some researchers believe that 
benzodiazepines are contraindicated for those with BPD.46  Where does 
the objective truth lie—take the benzodiazepines for anxiety or avoid 
them altogether?  Even mental health professionals cannot agree.47 
3. Cutting 
I have never been suicidal or attempted to commit suicide, although I 
often want to crawl into a hole (or bed) and escape.  Over the past few 
years, I have started to engage in self-mutilating behavior, usually 
cutting myself on my arms or legs with a razor or scissors.  For 
example, I once cut myself when I did not receive a position at my law 
school that I believed I was promised, when I was overwhelmed with 
 
46. Robert S. Bobrow, Benzodiazepines Revisited, 20 FAM. PRAC. 347, 348 (2003) (“Patients 
with borderline personality disorder are at great risk for dependence, and benzodiazepines are 
contraindicated [because BPD patients can become dependent on them].”).  Although 
benzodiazepines treat the symptoms of BPD, the higher risk of dependency mitigates their 
potential for good for individuals diagnosed with BPD. 
47. Compare Jean-Marc Cloos & Valérie Ferreira, Current Use of Benzodiazepines in Anxiety 
Disorders, 22 CURRENT OPINION IN PSYCHIATRY 90, 94 (2008) (“The sole use of BZDs in 
anxiety disorders, without having tried the alternatives, is to be avoided and . . . are 
contraindicated in patients with a history of substance abuse disorder.”), with Theo J.M. 
Ingenhoven & Hugo J. Duivenvoorden, Differential Effectiveness of Antipsychotics in Borderline 
Personality Disorder, 31 J. CLINICAL PSYCHOPHARMACOLOGY 489, 489 (2011) (“The American 
Psychiatric Association . . . advocates anti-psychotics, antidepressants, mood stabilizers, and 
benzodiazepines.”). 
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frustration that the law school’s response to the decreasing demand for 
legal education was too slow, or when administrators and colleagues 
could not distinguish between my mental illness and character “flaws” 
and in turn criticized me for manifestations of my illness (e.g., talking 
too loudly in class and avoiding conflict).  I have “a hard time 
regulating, expressing or understanding [my] emotions.  Physical injury 
distracts [me] from these painful emotions or helps [me] feel a sense of 
control over an otherwise uncontrollable situation.”48 
Cutting is a rhetorical device, a communication that I am in 
emotional pain.  To others it conjures up images of violence, which 
feeds into the stereotype that the mentally ill are “dangerous.”  It is not 
the case that “[p]eople who self-injure are crazy and/or dangerous. . . . 
Self-injury is how they cope. Slapping them with a ‘crazy’ or 
‘dangerous’ label isn’t accurate or helpful.”49  Ironically, this rhetorical 
device is not effective to the “insider”—frequently after I cut, faculty, 
students, and staff notice but ask me how I “fell.”  Cutting is part of my 
“outsider” narrative. 
4. Mood Swings 
Every day is like a roller coaster.  I go through periods of mania, 
anxiety, irritability, and depression, often within the same hour.  Those 
who know me well find my mood swings unpredictable.  I often feel a 
sense of mania from a small accomplishment.  For example, when I ran 
the William Mitchell Fellows Program, a leadership development 
program for students with exceptional capacity for leadership in law 
school and the legal profession, I felt an immediate “high” when I 
successfully recruited a student to William Mitchell.  I screamed the 
student’s name out of the car window and rewarded myself with ice 
cream or coffee.  A few minutes after that “high,” I started feeling a 
“low,” wondering when or if the next victory would come along. 
5. Anger 
Anger has plagued me since entering teaching, especially when I feel 
as if I have been treated “unjustly.”50  When I was a visiting professor 
at another school, I lost my temper with the associate dean, who had 
told me that I could not reschedule classes so that I could go on job 
 
48. Causes, Self-Injury/Cutting, MAYOCLINIC, http://www.mayoclinic.com/health/self-
injury/DS00775/DSECTION=causes (last visited July 16, 2012). 
49. Cutting and Self-Harm, HELPGUIDE.ORG, http://www.helpguide.org/mental/self_injury. 
htm (last visited July 16, 2012). 
50. See Cloud, supra note 44, at 1 (“What defines borderline personality disorder—and makes 
it so explosive—is the sufferers’ inability to calibrate their feelings and behavior.  When faced 
with an event that makes them depressed or angry, they often become inconsolable or enraged.”). 
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interviews.  While I was a teaching fellow at Temple, I yelled at a 
faculty member who did not inform me about a workshop that I was 
supposed to attend.  Even at William Mitchell, I often get angry when 
“rules” and “processes” are not followed—for example, when tenure 
subcommittees are not appointed by the specified date set in the Tenure 
Code.  My emotions overwhelm me in my quest for “justice,” although 
I do not believe my understanding of “justice” is wrong. 
6. Paranoia 
“Paranoid ideation” is defined as “suspiciousness or a nondelusional 
belief that one is being harassed, persecuted, or unfairly treated.”51  
This commonplace definition exposes the subjectivity of the DSM, 
despite the notion that its authors have “increas[ingly] adhere[d] to a 
model of mental disability as a measurable and biological 
phenomenon.”52  Is it problematic or symptomatic of an illness that one 
feels “unfairly treated,” especially when “fairness” is inherently 
subjective?  For example, in the fall of my third year at William 
Mitchell, the dean decided that the “normal” waiting period for tenure 
was four-and-half years on the tenure-track, despite the fact that our 
Tenure Code states that the “Board of Trustees may consider granting 
tenure at any time during a faculty member’s service with William 
Mitchell.”53  As I had been teaching for seven-and-a-half years at that 
time with significant scholarship and service, I believed that the dean’s 
interpretation was unfair and inconsistent with the black-and-white 
language of the Tenure Code.  One year later, administrators and 
colleagues were still puzzled as to why I felt that I was treated unfairly.  
Their reaction, more so than the dean’s initial decision, made me feel as 
if I was being “pushed out of the societally defined space of the 
‘normal.’”54 
On the subject of paranoia, I obsess over how faculty, staff, and 
students perceive me when my symptoms of mental illness are acute.  I 
usually spend less time at the office, am less focused and responsive, 
and worry that those who do not understand mental illness or do not 
know that I have a mental illness will judge me “unfairly.”  In hindsight, 
my reactions are, to some extent, irrational.  Yet, at the same time, when 
 
51. NARRIMAN C. SHAHROKH ET AL., THE LANGUAGE OF MENTAL HEALTH, A GLOSSARY OF 
PSYCHIATRIC TERMS 183 (2011). 
52. PRICE, supra note 1, at 36. 
53. WILLIAM MITCHELL COLLEGE OF LAW, FACULTY HANDBOOK 18 (Feb. 2011),      
available at http://web.wmitchell.edu/mitchellaneous/wp-content/uploads/2010/05/Faculty-
Handbk-20111.pdf. 
54. PRICE, supra note 1, at 29. 
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I explained my mental illness to one colleague, she said that she hoped I 
returned to “normal” soon, presupposing that there is a “normal” mind.  
Likewise, in writing about my accommodations, the dean quite 
innocently referred to “flare-ups” of my illness, as if the illness came 
and went and was somehow separate from who I am.  While my 
symptoms do vary from time to time, they are not like a rash that can be 
“cured” with a magic balm. 
This background has provided a glimpse into my “abnormal” mind.  I 
now go on to discuss Price’s work without leaving my narrative behind. 
II. MAD AT SCHOOL: THE INTERACTION BETWEEN RHETORIC AND THE 
LAW 
As a professor of English who teaches composition and rhetoric, 
Price analyzes “madness” in academic life from the perspective of 
rhetoric and academic discourse.  As a law professor, the starting point 
for my analysis is legal protections for academics with mental illness.  
In this Part, I discuss five areas where our analyses overlap: legal 
constructs, labels of the mentally impaired, teaching and learning, 
productivity, and collegiality. 
A. Legal Constructs 
The Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”) has largely failed 
college and university faculty with mental disabilities.55  In a 2003 
study, Suzanne Abram found that about ninety-three percent of 
“disabled” faculty, including those with mental or physical 
impairments, lost their cases under the ADA.56  As Abram explains, 
 
55. See Susan Stefan, “You’d Have to Be Crazy to Work Here”: Worker Stress, the Abusive 
Workplace, and Title I of the ADA, 31 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 795, 805 (1998) (“[J]udicial 
assumptions about the nature of psychiatric disabilities and essential employment functions have 
resulted in the near-total failure of the ADA to protect individuals with psychiatric disabilities 
from employment discrimination.”); Kathleen D. Zylan, Comment, Legislation that Drives Us 
Crazy: An Overview of “Mental Disability” under the Americans with Disabilities Act, 31 CUMB. 
L. REV. 79, 80 (2001) (“Particularly for the mentally ill, the ADA has failed to prevent 
discrimination in the workplace.”).  See also supra note 19 and accompanying text (explaining 
that the rigid requirements under the ADA prevent many mentally ill individuals from seeking 
protection under the statute). 
56. Suzanne Abram, The Americans with Disabilities Act in Higher Education: The Plight of 
Disabled Faculty, 32 J.L. & EDUC. 1, 5−6 (2003).  Abram articulates: 
When faculty sue their employers for alleged disability discrimination, they fare no 
better than plaintiffs in non-academic lawsuits.  By far, the majority of college and 
university instructors who sue under the ADA lose their cases.  Worse yet, they lose 
them at the summary judgment stage.  Since the standard for summary judgment is the 
absence of any genuine issue of material fact, or the inability of a reasonable jury to 
find for the plaintiff, it is particularly ominous that disabled faculty lose their cases at 
this early stage in the litigation, without obtaining the opportunity to put their cases 
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In short, courts have demonstrated a proclivity to dismiss ADA 
actions brought by disabled, or allegedly disabled, professors.  The 
actions often fail because the faculty members cannot walk the fine 
line between being disabled enough and being too disabled.  A 
disabled professor must construct his complaint so that he is 
demonstrably able to perform the essential functions of his position 
with reasonable accommodation and yet not so disabled that he is 
unable to perform his duties with accommodation.  In the majority of 
cases, the plaintiff professors seem unable to place themselves within 
this narrow range.57 
Price glosses over one of the biggest hurdles that “mad” faculty must 
overcome to succeed in ADA claims: they must prove that they have a 
“disability” covered by the Act.58  A person with a “disability” is one 
who: “(A) has a physical or mental impairment that substantially limits 
one or more major life activities of such individual; (B) has a record of 
such impairment; or (C) is being regarded as having such an 
impairment.”59  While the ADA expressly includes “working” as a 
major life activity,60 “[u]nder case law, being unable to perform a 
single, particular job [e.g., that of a tenure-track or tenured academic] is 
not generally considered a substantial limitation on the major life 
activity of working.”61 
While the faculty member with ADD or ADHD might be 
substantially limited in the major life activity of “concentrating,”62 or 
the academic with a learning disability substantially limited in the major 
life activity of “learning” or “reading,”63 the borderline or bipolar 
 
before a jury. 
Id. (footnote omitted).  Authors Rothstein and Irzyk discuss the issue of tenure with respect to 
disabilities:  
In some cases, faculty have argued that their denial of promotion or tenure has been 
related to a disability.  The courts have generally found, however, that even if a 
disability is related to inadequate performance in the area of teaching or scholarship, it 
does not excuse performance standards.  In most cases, the courts are finding that the 
institution’s action was based on nonperformance, not on the disability. 
LAURA ROTHSTEIN & JULIA IRZYK, DISABILITIES AND THE LAW § 3:26, at 334−35 & n.2 (4th ed. 
2012). 
57. Abram, supra note 56, at 11.  Abram’s study, of course, could not account for faculty with 
claims under the ADA who never brought their cases to court. 
58. See ROTHSTEIN & IRZYK, supra note 56, § 4:9, at 414 & n.30 (“Mental impairments as a 
disability are complex.  They are often difficult to diagnose, and there are also concerns about 
danger to self or others.”). 
59. 42 U.S.C. § 12102(1) (2006). 
60. Id. § 12102(2). 
61. ROTHSTEIN & IRZYK, supra note 56, § 4.8, at 396 n.62 (citing cases). 
62. See 42 U.S.C. § 12102(A) (defining “concentrating” as a major life activity).  
Inattentiveness is a common symptom of ADD or ADHD. 
63. See id. (identifying learning and reading as major life activities).  Individuals with learning 
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faculty member faces high hurdles in showing that he or she qualifies 
under the ADA’s definition of “disability.”64  For example, courts are 
unlikely to view “interacting with others” as a “major life activity” 
when asserted by an individual with a mental impairment.65  Because 
the ADA approaches “disability” from a medical model, focusing on the 
actual impairment itself, the “normal” person might not understand how 
the mentally impaired academic is “substantially limited” in a major life 
activity.66 However, from the psychosocial model that Price and I 
 
disabilities experience difficulties with both. 
64. See Ramona L. Paetzold, How Courts, Employers, and the ADA Disable Persons with 
Bipolar Disorder, 9 EMP. RTS. & EMP. POL’Y J. 293, 314 (2005).  Paetzold describes these 
hurdles: 
In addition, [bipolar disorder] is easily doubted because its manifestations are often 
behaviors that everyone believes they have experienced.  It is easy to say that all 
people have good days and bad days; all people have periods of elation and periods of 
irritability; all people have days that they cannot concentrate versus days when mental 
abilities seem stronger; and all people have periods during which they exercise poor 
judgment.  People with [bipolar disorder] may thus be dismissed as merely 
hypersensitive, more emotional, lacking in self-regulation, or engaging in greater levels 
of self-promotion.  What are missing from this construction are the extremes that 
persons with [bipolar disorder] experience, their lack of ability to control the extreme 
moods and concurrent experiences, their risk of suicide, the progression of their 
disorder, and the debilitation that they suffer as a result of the devastation done to their 
lives. 
Id.  I have often been dismissed by administrators and colleagues as “hypersensitive,” 
“overemotional,” and “self-promotional.” 
65. Wendy F. Hensel, Interacting with Others: A Major Life Activity under the Americans 
with Disabilities Act?, 2002 WIS. L. REV. 1139, 1142 (describing that these cases reveal a 
disturbing trend: “Although the Supreme Court has strongly indicated that courts must evaluate 
whether an activity is ‘major’ by looking to the activity’s significance to the population generally 
rather than to the claimant specifically, the pattern in several cases suggests the contrary is 
occurring.”).  Furthermore: 
Courts appear far more likely to recognize interacting with others as a major life 
activity, or a significant component of an established major life activity, when asserted 
by an individual with a physical, rather than mental, impairment.  Likewise, cases 
stemming from an individual’s inability to interact with others as a result of other 
people’s unsubstantiated prejudices concerning physical ability, rather than any 
specific individual action, are viewed favorably by courts.  In sharp contrast, where 
interacting with others is asserted by an individual with a psychiatric impairment 
involved in questionable behavior in the workplace, courts are far less likely to 
recognize this activity as “major,” even when the individual’s inability to interact 
effectively is a result of group harassment and exclusion. 
Id. (footnotes omitted).  For example, the Tenth Circuit—in granting summary judgment to an 
employer following an employee’s claim alleging a hostile work environment—determined that 
the employee was not limited in his ability to sleep, walk, or interact with others and was not 
regarded as disabled.  See Steele v. Thiokol Corp., 241 F.3d 1248 (10th Cir. 2001). 
66. See Paetzold, supra note 64, at 324 (explaining that courts’ analysis of major life activities 
sometimes focuses too much on physical limitations rather than the issues confronted by an 
individual with BPD). 
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favor,67 “‘disabilities’ result from situations that are themselves 
disabling.”68  From this perspective, and not from the perspective of a 
“normal” person (including some judges), it is easier to understand how 
mentally impaired academics can be “substantially limited” in the major 
life activities of working,69 concentrating, or thinking, and why 
“interacting with others” should be considered a major life activity.  
Maybe a court would even recognize “that having the capability to live 
one’s life for some stable period of time without unpredictable and 
sometimes extreme mood swings may be a major life activity.”70 
To qualify for protection under the ADA, a faculty member must be 
“otherwise qualified” to perform the “essential requirements” or 
functions of the job, “taking into account reasonable accommodations 
that could be provided.”71  Price notes the potential clash between the 
directive to provide “reasonable accommodations” and “the faculty 
member’s burden to show that he or she can perform the ‘essential 
functions’ of the job.”72  If academic institutions define “essential 
functions” too narrowly, they unnecessarily risk the exclusion of faculty 
members with mental impairments.73  I know firsthand the difficulty in 
 
67. See PRICE, supra note 1, at 19 (“My appreciation of psychosocial has been affirmed by 
philosopher Cal Montgomery . . . .”). 
68.  Paetzold, supra note 64, at 320.  Paetzold observed: 
Thus, from a social model perspective, the level of impairment experienced by a 
person with [bipolar disorder] is determined in part by the physical layout of the work 
area, interactions with supervisors, interactions with coworkers, the general culture 
within the work team or organizational group, general attitudes and behaviors within 
the work environment, flexibility in manner and time of working, and the nature of the 
task. 
Id. 
69. See id. at 369 (“The issue is not whether the employee with [bipolar disorder] is restricted 
from performing an entire class of jobs, or even a broad range of jobs within a class, but whether 
work circumstances are disabling her so that she cannot perform this job.  If so, then the 
organization should be expected to make reasonable accommodations to assist her in performing 
the job.  If this is not the standard, people with [bipolar disorder] will be excluded from American 
workplaces and will not be able to live independently as part of the larger society.”). 
70. Id. at 368. 
71. ROTHSTEIN & IRZYK, supra note 56, § 4.10, at 420−21 & n.2 (citing Se. Cmty. Coll. v. 
Davis, 442 U.S. 397, 407 (1979)). 
72. PRICE, supra note 1, at 108. 
73. See, e.g., Darcangelo v. Verizon Md., Inc., 189 F. App’x 217, 218 (4th Cir. 2006) (holding 
that bipolar employee did not qualify under the ADA because she could not interact with 
coworkers, an “essential function” of the employee’s position).  In defining the position’s 
“essential functions,” the court relied on the defendant’s code of conduct, which “directs 
employees to be ‘respectful, cooperative, and helpful toward customers, suppliers, our co-
workers, employees and the general public’ and to refrain from acting in ‘an abusive, threatening, 
discriminatory, harassing or obscene manner toward any employee or others with whom we come 
in contact during the course of business.’”  Id.   
 Paetzold further describes the issue of disability within the context of employment: 
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getting reasonable accommodations for mental illness.74  I have 
struggled to get the primary accommodations that I have requested—
written job responsibilities with significant advance notice of teaching 
and service obligations.  I have been asked that my doctor provide a list 
of “work restrictions,” rhetoric suggesting that I could not perform 
certain functions of my job.  To the contrary, I perform all of the 
functions of my job but need reasonable accommodations to do so. 
Price makes two wrong moves in criticizing the ADA and how courts 
have applied it.  She questions whether the “essential functions” of the 
job of a law professor should change to accommodate faculty with 
disabilities: “For example, what if a professor who has agoraphobia or 
panic disorder must miss classes on an unpredictable basis.  Does the 
burden lie on him to find a substitute, no matter how short the notice or 
distressing the situation that gave rise to his absence in the first 
 
Employers should not be able to rely on stereotypical beliefs about the personal 
failings or other unsuitability of a person with [bipolar disorder] in establishing the 
essential job functions.  For example, by saying that “getting along with others” is an 
essential job function, it could be that employers are thinking that employees who 
cannot perform this function are simply deficient as people and could never be good 
employees or perhaps that they would introduce workplace conflict.  Employers could 
also be reflecting on their own lack of experience and ideas regarding trying to 
accommodate interpersonal interactions, i.e., their inability to think “outside of the 
box.”  Courts must place a stronger burden on employers to justify their choices for 
essential job functions so as not to discriminate against persons with [bipolar disorder]. 
. . . . 
. . . Although all job functions can be manipulated to have negative consequences for 
persons with [bipolar disorder], those requiring subjective assessment may leave far 
too much to employer discretion.  Being friendly and getting along with others are 
subjectively evaluated job functions that are problematic because they are relatively 
incapable of objective measurement.  It will always be difficult to know when the level 
of performance of such job functions is acceptable. 
Paetzold, supra note 64, at 370−71.  
74. On the issue of accommodation, Paetzold opines that: 
It may be difficult for the employee with [bipolar disorder] to articulate precisely how 
she is impaired or what she may need to assist her in doing her job effectively.  Placing 
a greater burden on the employer to initiate the process, provide suggestions, 
communicate with doctors (with the employee’s permission), show patience, and 
generally facilitate the process would help to allow employees with [bipolar disorder] 
to remain in the workplace. 
Id. at 365−66.  Price additionally notes that: 
[R]equests for accommodations for psychiatric disabilities are “routinely deemed per 
se unreasonable by reviewing courts.”  Such accommodations include working at 
home, being transferred away from certain coworkers or supervisors, or modification 
of standards for behavior.  In short, not only are workers with mental disabilities likely 
to be considered a threat, and thus unqualified for employment, but their requests for 
accommodations are likely to be deemed “unreasonable.” 
PRICE, supra note 1, at 111 (internal citations omitted). 
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place?”75  To the extent that teaching classes regularly is an “essential 
function” of a law professor (which it should be), the professor who 
regularly and unpredictably misses classes (even with reasonable 
accommodations) is not fulfilling that function and should not receive 
protection under the ADA.  To suggest otherwise is to suggest that 
faculty with mental impairments are less capable than faculty without 
impairments, which pushes faculty like me unwillingly “out of the 
societally defined space of the ‘normal.’”76 
Price’s second wrong move is to confuse the reader about the effect 
of the 2008 ADA amendments.  She is correct that the “Equal 
Employment Opportunity Commission states that disability should be 
defined without consideration of ‘medicines.’”77  That has been the 
state of the law since the amendments were passed.78  However, she 
then claims (as if it were the current law) that “several judgments in 
1999 and following found that an individual’s qualification for [being] 
disabled should be assessed in a ‘corrected,’ that is, ‘medicated’ 
state.”79  Those cases, which were decided before the amendments, are 
clear in stating that mitigating measures, such as medication, should not 
be taken into account when considering whether a disability imposes a 
“substantial limitation.”80 
B. Naming 
To refer to academics with mental impairments, Price writes, 
“[T]hese days I’m using mental disability. . . .  [T]his term can include 
 
75. PRICE, supra note 1, at 108.  Price provides an example: 
In [Horton v. Board of Trustees of Community College District No. 508], the professor 
claimed to have an “unspecified nervous disorder” and missed time from teaching.  
The court ruled that since the “essential functions” of a community college professor’s 
job are to “prepare, attend, and teach classes,” and his disorder caused him to miss 
class, he did not qualify. . . .  If presence is considered an essential function of an 
academic position, and presence is defined in terms of one’s fleshy appearance in a 
classroom, then many faculty members with mental disabilities are de facto not 
qualified for their jobs. 
Id. at 112 (internal citations omitted). 
76. PRICE, supra note 1, at 29.  See id. (“[Disability Studies] concerns itself with human 
difference, and emphasizes the ways that people with disabilities are ostracized, medicalized, 
heroized, and otherwise pushed out of the societally defined space of the ‘normal.’ . . .  
[Disability Studies] has a long history of interest in the ways that language is used to construct 
formations of power and difference.”). 
77. Id. at 110. 
78. See 42 U.S.C.A. § 12-102(E)(i) (West 2012) (stating that the determination of whether an 
impairment substantially limits a major life activity shall be made without considering factors 
such as medication).  See also 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(v) (2012) (indicating that a medical analysis 
is not required; however, the presentation of such an analysis is not prohibited). 
79. PRICE, supra note 1, at 110. 
80. ROTHSTEIN & IRZYK, supra note 56, § 4.8, at 398 nn.68−71. 
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not only madness, but also cognitive and intellectual dis/abilities of 
various kinds.”81  While “mental disability” is perhaps accurate for the 
student with dyslexia, ADHD, or autism, I disagree with Price’s choice 
of labels for “mad” academics with a myriad of mood and personality 
disorders for three reasons. 
First, part of the problem with the term “disability” is that it presumes 
an inability to do things that a “normal” person can do.  This stance 
ignores the fact that what an individual can or cannot do often depends 
on the social context82—e.g., an academic environment—and the fact 
that faculty members with mental impairments are often able to do 
everything a “normal” faculty member can do, with medication, 
support, workplace flexibility, and other reasonable accommodations.  
Labeling me as “disabled” suggests I am incompetent, which I am not.  
On the contrary, I have been able to exceed expectations in the 
“essential functions” of my current job. 
Second, the word “disability” demands diagnostic and objective 
precision, which Price abhors.  As she states, “[p]sychiatric discourse 
positions itself as natural, scientific, and objective, a system through 
which human minds may be reliably measured as ‘crazy’ or ‘normal,’ 
and through which human bodies can therefore be sorted into their 
appropriate spaces: the educational institution or the mental 
institution.”83  When a faculty member has received multiple and 
conflicting diagnoses, and has a myriad of mental health symptoms, 
how can we define his or her impairment?  I would not begin to know 
how to describe my mental “disability,” and neither medicine nor 
science has been any more successful.  Once we use the term “mental 
disability,” we devalue the individual experience. 
Last, and most important from my perspective, the term “disability” 
buys into the ADA’s legal constructs.  This is problematic for the 
faculty member who has a mental impairment (but does not qualify for 
protection under the ADA) because there is a risk of altogether 
delegitimizing his or her impairment.  The ADA also does not 
adequately protect academics with mental illness.84  Faculty members 
with mental impairments have to work outside of the confines of the 
ADA—whether through narrative and rhetoric, democratic institutional 
 
81. PRICE, supra note 1, at 19. 
82. See supra notes 66−70 and accompanying text (describing the psychosocial model for 
approaching “disability,” which involves analyzing situations that result in disabilities).  
83. PRICE, supra note 1, at 33.  
84. See supra notes 55–57 and accompanying text (explaining how the ADA has not protected 
academics from employment discrimination).  
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governance, or legislative or grassroots advocacy85—to ensure equal 
participation in academic life.  The term “mental disability” hampers 
this effort because, to a large extent, “mad” faculty members with 
“disabilities” have a safe haven under the ADA and are included as 
equal participants in academic life; those without “disabilities” under 
the ADA are often excluded.  To break free of the ADA as a construct 
to define who is “able” and who is “disabled,” we need to break free 
from the term “mental disability.” 
I prefer the term “mental illness.”  Illness can incorporate a host of 
diagnoses and symptoms, and does not carry with it the baggage that the 
mentally ill academic might be incompetent in performing his or her 
job.  Price criticizes this term: 
Mental illness introduces a discourse of well/unwellness into the 
notion of madness; its complement is mental health, the term of 
choice for the medical community as well as insurance companies and 
social support services.  The unwell/well paradigm has many 
problems, particularly its implication that a mad person needs to be 
“cured” by some means.86 
While I agree with Price’s critique to some extent, many mental 
illnesses are chronic (as are many physical illnesses like cancers and 
autoimmune disorders), and there is no expectation that they will be 
“cured.”  Additionally, the term “mental illness” does not have to be 
defined naturally, scientifically, or objectively, but, unrestrained by the 
ADA, can be defined subjectively in light of the “mad” academic’s 
individual symptoms and experiences.  Admittedly, however, there are 
problems with any term used to describe “madness.”  Just as “illness” 
might suggest temporariness or an impairment that can be cured, 
“disability” suggests permanence or an impairment that cannot be 
mitigated or ameliorated. 
C. Teaching and Learning 
My own experiences with mental illness at Harvard Law greatly 
inform my teaching.  Price organizes her discussion of teaching and 
learning within three constructs: presence and absence, participation and 
discussion, and resistance.  I do the same. 
1. Presence and Absence 
A student physically present in class is not necessarily 
 
85. For an example of an organization that fosters grassroots advocacy to overcome the stigma 
of mental illness, see BRING CHANGE 2 MIND, http://www.bringchange2mind.org (last visited 
Jan. 11, 2013). 
86. PRICE, supra note 1, at 12. 
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“experiencing” the class.87  Conversely, a student not physically present 
in class may “experience” the class: “A student with social anxiety, or 
[a disorder falling] on the autism spectrum, for example, might get a 
great deal more out of the learning process that does not involve close 
contact or interaction with others.”88  I learned best in law school by 
reading text; I often did not attend class when not required to do so, yet 
did well in the courses that I did not regularly attend.  Students’ 
disabilities may play a role in the students’ physical presence in class,89 
and therefore, I do not require attendance in my doctrinal classes and 
provide students many other ways to learn.  As an example, I post 
copies of all of my class notes online. 
Of course, students can be absent from class for reasons unrelated to 
a mental impairment—they might be unmotivated or disinterested 
(which, of course, could be related to mental illness), have a conflicting 
commitment (e.g., a job, family, moot court competition, etc.), or be 
physically ill.  Consequently, I take attendance and reach out to any 
students who consistently miss class, offering pastoral advice and 
academic assistance.  In my transactional skills classes, however, I 
require students to attend class and participate—students’ learning is 
thwarted without active attendance and participation (e.g., as a client, 
co-counsel, or opposing counsel).  In a law school, students need to 
learn how to keep professional obligations despite their disabilities,90 
and I try to provide safer places91 for them to do so (e.g., reaching out 
to a seemingly anxious student in a negotiation for one-on-one 
coaching, or encouraging students to take a break on their own to gather 
their thoughts).  Ironically, students in these classes often talk to my co-
teachers and me about issues related to their mental health, partly 
because of the intense interactions and critical self-reflection that we 
require. 
 
87. Id. at 66. 
88. Id. 
89. See id. at 65 (explaining that some studies of classroom attendance erroneously ignore that 
disabled students may face barriers to physically attending class).  
90. Many commentators have described the importance of teaching law students 
professionalism.  See, e.g., Douglas S. Lang, The Role of Law Professors: A Critical Force in 
Shaping Integrity and Professionalism, 42 S. TEX. L. REV. 509, 512 (2001) (“Although law 
professors could easily set law students on the track towards honest, ethical and professional 
behavior in the practice of law, many professors refuse to act.”). 
91. See PRICE, supra note 1, at 100−01 (discussing “safe houses,” which are defined as “social 
and intellectual spaces where groups can constitute themselves . . . with high degrees of trust, 
shared understandings, [and] temporary protection from legacies of oppression” (citations 
omitted)). 
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2. Participation and Discussion 
I do not use the Socratic method or cold-call on students; every time I 
think about doing so, I am brought back to my experience in Professor 
Areeda’s antitrust class.  The Socratic method can alienate or silence 
students who identify with “outsider” groups.92  I give students many 
opportunities to participate through “multimodal communication”93—in 
class, they work individually, in pairs, and in groups; can work on 
written assignments by themselves or with classmates; receive 
information in writing, verbally, and visually; and can communicate 
with me by email or in person.94  I also ask groups of students to 
 
92. See, e.g., Jennifer Jolly-Ryan, Disabilities to Exceptional Abilities, Law Students with 
Disabilities, Nontraditional Learners, and the Law Teacher as a Learner, 6 NEV. L.J. 116, 
124−25 (2005) (“Scholars now criticize the Socratic Method as a primary teaching tool, despite 
its long reign in law schools.  It is ineffective for most types of learners.  Some scholars describe 
it as ‘mystifying and patriarchal, persisting because of large classes and professors too lazy to 
adopt new teaching methods.’  It has been particularly ineffective for teaching women, minorities, 
and students with a wide variety of learning styles.  However, law professors cling to the Socratic 
Method as their primary teaching tool.” (footnotes omitted)); Benjamin V. Madison, III, The 
Elephant in Law School Classrooms: Overuse of the Socratic Method as an Obstacle to Teaching 
Modern Law Students, 85 U. DET. MERCY L. REV. 293, 301 (2008) (“Does the unwillingness to 
embrace methods to complement the Socratic method actually represent an unhealthy elitism?  
Evidence suggests that the large-class Socratic format discourages participation of many students, 
particularly women and minorities.  If women and minorities do not benefit from the pure-
Socratic approach, we ought to ask ourselves whether professors are ironically perpetuating a 
subtle form of discrimination by their insistence upon a purely Socratic classroom.” (footnote 
omitted)); Jennifer L. Rosato, The Socratic Method and Women Law Students: Humanize, Don’t 
Feminize, 7 S. CAL. REV. L. & WOMEN’S STUD. 37, 37−38 (1997) (“Complaints have been 
leveled against the Socratic Method of law teaching for many years.  Notwithstanding these 
complaints, the Socratic Method continues to be the primary pedagogy used by law school 
teachers.  Renewed concerns about the continued use of this teaching method have been raised by 
recent studies that address its effect on women law students.  The results of these studies are 
overwhelmingly negative: they conclude that the Socratic Method alienates, oppresses, 
traumatizes and silences women.” (footnotes omitted)). 
93. See PRICE, supra note 1, at 96−98 (discussing “multimodal communication,” or 
implementing a variety of modes and styles of communication). 
94. Students should be exposed to varying types of communication both because they have 
diverse learning styles and because they will be required to communicate in different ways as 
lawyers.  Professor Alaka describes the need for this type of learning: 
Similarly, regardless of whether one self-identifies as a visual, auditory, kinesthetic, 
or tactile learner, lawyers regularly use each of those modalities in practice.  They 
process information by reading and synthesizing legal authority and documents 
obtained during discovery, for example, and act on oral directives from clients, judges, 
and colleagues.  As professional writers, lawyers create myriad types of documents, 
including those that reflect their analysis of the law, their understanding of clients’ 
goals, and their informed strategic choices.  Although personality might ultimately 
determine a lawyer’s career choices and, thus, the frequency with which she engages in 
particular activities, lawyers need to develop the ability to obtain and use information 
across the spectrum of identified modalities. 
Aϊda M. Alaka, Learning Styles: What Difference Do the Differences Make?, 5 CHARLESTON L. 
REV. 133, 167−68 (2011).  See also Robin Boyle & Rita Dunn, Teaching Law Students through 
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prepare problem sets and discuss the assigned problems in class.  I 
emphasize ongoing feedback, including positive feedback and 
encouragement of students,95 comments on drafts of student work, and 
opportunities for students to provide me feedback on the class.96 
3. Resistance 
My classroom is unorthodox.  I stand on desks, yell, make self-
deprecating jokes, tell stories, and have even been known to take a 
student’s water bottle and dump it out on the floor (to illustrate the tort 
of conversion).  Consequently, the norms in my classroom are flexible, 
inclusive, and appeal to students with a variety of learning styles and 
backgrounds.  I view student resistance flexibly, and “seek to include 
disruption of [my] own classroom-based agendas as part of the learning 
process.”97  For example, I taught an intensive one-week simulation 
class, and students were near mutiny after staying up all night to 
 
Individual Learning Styles, 62 ALB. L. REV. 213, 223 (1998) (“A growing number of law 
professors agree that students do not all learn the same way.  This leads to the conclusion that 
more emphasis on individual learning styles should be explored at the law school level.” 
(footnote omitted)).  Furthermore, “[b]ecause all students do not learn the same way, law 
professors should avoid adopting an across-the-board teaching method.”  Id. 
95. Faculty members should give students prompt feedback, including positive feedback.  See 
Gerald F. Hess, Heads and Hearts: The Teaching and Learning Environment in Law School, 52 J. 
LEGAL EDUC. 75, 106 (2002) (“The importance of formative feedback for student learning cannot 
be overestimated.  Prompt feedback has a clear positive relationship to student achievement and 
satisfaction.  Frequent positive feedback helps students become self-motivated, independent 
learners.”); Christine Ver Ploeg & Jim Hilbert, Project-Based Learning and ADR Education: One 
Model for Teaching ADR Students to Problem Solve for Real, 11 APPALACHIAN J.L. 157, 182 
(2012) (“So little of law school is spent on providing feedback, and this is an important time for 
the students to feel good about their work.  Typically, the clients are extremely happy about the 
work product, so it can be fun to debrief the students on the clients’ satisfaction.” (footnote 
omitted)).  However, in order for this feedback to become “real,” “faculty could actually go 
around the room and tell each student individually what particular contributions were valuable, 
thereby providing both positive feedback and public acknowledgement.”  Id. 
96. See PRICE, supra note 1, at 96 (discussing the provision of feedback).  Joan Catherine 
Bohl has described the issue of feedback with respect to current generations: 
This characteristic has particular significance for Gen X Y students, who learn best 
when they are actively engaged with the material.  A key part of active engagement, 
and of participation in the classroom, is the give and take of feedback between 
professor and student.  Feedback—like frequent opportunities for evaluation—
confirms to students that they have grasped the concepts involved.  With this 
confirmation, they can progress through the learning process in the small steps their 
life experiences have taught them to expect.  Since their technology-laced experience 
has conditioned them to receive information in small, discrete portions, rather than 
engaging in a lengthy process of learning with results deferred, frequent evaluation can 
enhance the learning process directly. 
Joan Catherine Bohl, Generations X and Y in Law School: Practical Strategies for Teaching the 
“MTV/Google” Generation, 54 LOY. L. REV. 775, 785 (2008) (footnotes omitted). 
97. PRICE, supra note 1, at 79−80. 
5_DUHL  3/9/2013  1:35 PM 
2013] Over the Borderline 799 
complete research memos.  I used this experience both to encourage 
students to reflect critically on what they learned and for me to reflect 
on how I could give feedback to boost the students’ enthusiasm and 
reduce the workload for the remainder of the week.  I welcome students 
to “interrupt the conventional script of classroom discourse”98 as long 
as they do so civilly and professionally.  I often interrupt that 
“conventional script” myself, by, for example, leading a mindfulness or 
relaxation exercise in the middle of class. 
D. Productivity 
As Price notes, we “continue to think of the prototypical faculty 
member as a three-trick pony, equally skilled in research, teaching, and 
service.”99  In response to this traditional conception of “productivity,” 
Price asks two pertinent questions: 
The first question is[:] What is the nature of the thing?  In other 
words, what in fact are the essential functions of work as a faculty 
member? . . . The second question is[:] What is the quality of the 
thing?  In other words, how good is the faculty member’s performance 
in teaching, scholarship, service (and perhaps collegiality)?100 
Critics of legal education have argued that law schools should 
redistribute resources away from scholarship and toward student 
learning and development.101  Law schools are beginning to rethink the 
 
98. Id. at 79. 
99. Id. at 136. 
100. Id. at 107.  
101. See Lauren Carasik, Renaissance or Retrenchment: Legal Education at a Crossroads, 44 
IND. L. REV. 735, 767 (2011) (arguing that a way to justify fewer full-time faculty is based on the 
lack of utility “of increasingly esoteric faculty scholarship” that law students finance, but from 
which they derive no real benefit).  Instead, “the money spent supporting law professors to 
produce scholarship could be better spent providing direct benefits to the students who finance 
those salaries.”  Id.  See also Mary A. Lynch, An Evaluation of Ten Concerns about Using 
Outcomes in Legal Education, 38 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 976, 985 (2012) (“Some legal 
education reformers maintain that resources in legal education have been disproportionately 
weighted towards scholarship goals and away from professional development of students.  They 
argue for what they see as a ‘fairer’ distribution of resources.” (footnote omitted)); Brent E. 
Newton, Preaching What They Don’t Practice: Why Law Faculties’ Preoccupation with 
Impractical Scholarship and Devaluation of Professional Competencies Obstruct Reform in the 
Legal Academy, 62 S.C. L. REV. 105, 154−55 (2010) (finding unacceptable that a substantial 
portion “of the tuition that law students pay currently serves as a cross-subsidy that allows 
professors to spend most of their time researching and writing impractical law review articles 
rather than effectively teaching students the knowledge, skills, and professional values they will 
need to be competent (and employable) lawyers”).  Instead, Newton proposes that schools strike a 
healthier balance between their functions as both “learning institutions and producers of legal 
scholarship.”  Id. at 155.  Because of the latter’s current dominance over the former, schools have 
“mostly impractical law faculties [that] must cease before [certain] pedagogical and curricular 
reforms . . . can be realized.  The professoriate must practice before it preaches.”  Id. (footnotes 
omitted).  
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role of faculty,102 and some proponents of reform argue that law school 
faculty should focus either on teaching or scholarship.103  As Price 
argues, a “key structural shift that would benefit not only faculty with 
mental disabilities, but all faculty . . . would be a radical reconfiguration 
of the research-teaching-service triad, with a proliferation of differently 
structured positions according to [institutional] need, ability, and 
desire.”104 
If we were to rethink the role of faculty, we could reexamine the role 
of the faculty member’s “presence” in the classroom.105  Law schools 
are beginning to shift more resources to online teaching and learning to 
increase access to legal education.106  To the extent online teaching and 
learning further pedagogical objectives, such as appealing to different 
learning styles107 and achieving certain learning outcomes,108 faculty 
 
102. See John O. Sonsteng et al., Legal Education Renaissance: A Practical Approach for the 
Twenty-First Century, 34 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 303, 467 (2007) (“[We should determine the] 
appropriate role of faculty, while taking into account the impact of cost on individual students, 
the established educational objectives, the necessary balance between the faculty’s role in 
education and scholarship, and the extent to which a particular faculty structure requires students 
to find crucial training outside the law school.” (footnote omitted)). 
103. As an example, Newton proposes some alternatives: 
First, law schools should create two types of tenure-track professorships, “research” 
professors and “teaching” professors, with equal opportunities in the tenure-track 
system (although evaluated differently for tenure), equitable voting rights in faculty 
governance, and equivalent salaries.  Unlike the current system, which routinely 
assigns the bulk of teaching responsibilities to faculty members who have been hired to 
be impractical scholars, the proposed system would permit a certain segment of the 
faculty, at most one-third, to focus on what they do best: theoretical, interdisciplinary 
research and scholarship.  Such research professors, only a small percentage with both 
a Ph.D. and a law degree, would carry lesser teaching loads than teaching professors, 
and in addition would only teach courses in their areas of expertise (e.g., statistics and 
econometrics for lawyers). 
Newton, supra note 101, at 148−49 (footnotes omitted). 
104. PRICE, supra note 1, at 137. 
105. See id. at 112 (“Here we see the problem of presence, explored in terms of students’ 
experience in chapter 2, affecting faculty members as well.”). 
106. See, e.g., Gregory M. Duhl, Equipping Our Lawyers: Mitchell’s Outcomes-Based 
Approach to Legal Education, 38 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 906, 943–44 (2012) (“Online and 
blended courses increase access for students, especially nontraditional students . . . .  We need 
more courses that are fully online, especially bar courses, which enable students to complete 
externships in rural parts of Minnesota . . . .”). 
107. See David P. Diaz & Ryan B. Cartnal, Students’ Learning Styles in Two Classes: Online 
Distance Learning and Equivalent On-Campus, 47 C. TEACHING 130, 135 (1999) (concluding 
that information about the different learning styles of participating students should impact the 
style and structure of the “distance education environment,” or online courses). 
108. See U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC., EVALUATION OF EVIDENCE-BASED PRACTICES IN ONLINE 
LEARNING: A META-ANALYSIS AND REVIEW OF ONLINE LEARNING STUDIES 18 (2010), 
available at http://www2.ed.gov/rschstat/eval/tech/evidence-based-practices/finalreport.pdf (“The 
overall finding of the meta-analysis is that classes with online learning (whether taught 
completely online or blended) on average produce stronger student learning outcomes than do 
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members, such as professors who suffer from panic disorder, could be 
“present” in the classroom without making a “fleshy appearance.”109  
Likewise, the faculty member who, like me, feels awkward and 
uncomfortable at conferences,110 could discuss his or her work through 
blogs, emails, and peer exchange or feedback.111 
There remains one caveat.  While the experiences and perspectives of 
“mad” faculty can provide the answers to Price’s questions, particularly 
because we can relate to students with different learning styles and 
dis/abilities, we should define the “essential functions” of a professor in 
the context of institutional needs.  Price starts with the premise that 
some “mad” faculty members cannot fulfill the “essential functions” of 
a professor as traditionally defined, and then argues that all faculty 
could benefit from a reconceptualization of faculty “productivity.”112  
Her rhetorical move undercuts the “outsider” narrative; we have more 
credibility to advocate for institutional change if we are “competent” as 
measured by current institutional norms. 
The converse of Price’s concern as to whether mentally ill faculty 
members can fulfill the “essential functions” of their jobs is the risk that 
they be held to a higher “productivity” standard than “normal” faculty.  
For example, the Faculty Handbook at my law school states: 
To be granted and retain tenure, faculty members at William Mitchell 
are expected to demonstrate competent and professional performance 
in four areas: (1) teaching; (2) scholarship; (3) service; and (4) 
complying with the standards of professional conduct.  Each of these 
areas is among the essential functions of the position of a faculty 
 
classes with solely face-to-face instruction.”); Gary A. Munneke, Managing a Law Practice: 
What You Need to Learn in Law School, 30 PACE L. REV. 1207, 1245 (2010) (“Just as legal 
services are no longer bound by the four walls of the law office, education without walls is not 
only feasible, but desirable.  Without denigrating the value of face-to-face contact, distance 
learning, like distance representation of clients, provides opportunities to enhance and expand the 
scope of communications.”). 
109. PRICE, supra note 1, at 112. 
110. Cf. PRICE, supra note 1, at 121−29 (discussing “productivity” and “collegiality” in the 
context of academic conferences). 
111. Price gives an example: 
I’m delighted to give and receive directly voice feedback when I can; however, being 
queer and mentally disabled myself, I can well understand that silence may be the most 
empowering strategy that one has available at a given time.  For this reason we—
faculty, administrators, and public advocates—must understand that feedback comes in 
many forms. 
PRICE, supra note 1, at 131.  
112. See supra note 73 and accompanying text (describing how academic institutions may 
narrowly define “essential functions” in a way that excludes faculty members with mental 
impairments). 
5_DUHL 3/9/2013  1:35 PM 
802 Loyola University Chicago Law Journal [Vol.  44 
member at William Mitchell.  Faculty members must demonstrate 
overall competent and professional performance.113 
Despite this language, some of our faculty members do not engage in 
scholarship, for example.  As a mentally ill faculty member, I could be 
held to a higher standard than “normal” faculty members because I must 
show I can fulfill the “essential functions” of my job.  Two higher 
education lawyers recommend that institutions “[m]ake sure that 
workload policies and practices are clear and are followed consistently, 
documenting any deviations from standard practice (e.g., faculty 
members given special projects, research leaves, etc.).”114 
E. Collegiality 
While writing this Article, I happened to read this advice for faculty 
candidates giving job talks from Dan Shapiro, Chair of the Humanities 
Department at the Penn State College of Medicine: 
Fragile faculty members are a drain on our system, and more 
important, on me.  If they need a certain temperature in their office 
(within two degrees), can’t function if their mailbox gets moved, and 
panic if the class times change, then life will be hard on all of us.  I 
need faculty members who can help nourish our fragile students even 
in tough circumstances, not suck away all the resources because they 
themselves can’t tolerate life’s normal insults.115 
My reaction was total disbelief.  Shapiro’s rhetoric—and perhaps his 
actions—exclude the “fragile,” the hypersensitive, and many of the 
mentally ill from positions in his department.  I regularly ask the 
facilities department to turn down the temperature in my office and in 
my classrooms because I sweat from general anxiety; I often get 
flustered by a room change or a schedule change; and life’s “normal 
insults”—for example, one negative comment on a course evaluation—
bother me.  In excluding me, and others like me, Professor Shapiro 
excludes our energy, our creativity, our voices, and perhaps our abilities 
to relate to the “fragile” students whom he describes. 
Price recounts the common narrative of how mentally ill faculty 
members “are labeled as ‘difficult’ and become the object of 
administrative hand-wringing, or even formal sanctions.  In this case, 
we might think of Professor Y, who is notorious for her outbursts in 
 
113. FACULTY HANDBOOK, supra note 53, at 12 (emphasis added). 
114. BARBARA A. LEE & PETER H. RUGER, ACCOMMODATING FACULTY AND STAFF WITH 
PSYCHIATRIC DISABILITIES 16–17 (2003).  
115. Dan Shapiro, Grim Job Talks Are a Buzz Kill, CHRON. OF HIGHER EDUC. (July 16, 
2012), http://chronicle.com/article/Grim-Job-Talks-AreaBuzzKill/132843/?cid=at&utm_source 
=at&utm_medium=en.  Cf. PRICE, supra note 1, at 117–18 (discussing the effects of a job search 
on faculty candidates with disabilities). 
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faculty meetings and who is whispered to be ‘unbalanced.’”116  The 
speaker whom my law school invited to our spring faculty retreat to 
provide sensitivity training on mental illness consults with employers on 
working with “difficult” people and talked about how to “manage” and 
“deal with” mentally ill academics.  There is also an assumption in 
much writing that mentally ill faculty members are not part of the 
“collegial” group.117  I might be “paranoid,” itself an often-described 
trait of “uncollegial[ity],”118 but I perceive that I am often viewed as 
difficult or demanding, ironically, even in my request for 
accommodations.119 
The American Association of University Professors warns against 
using “collegiality” as an independent criterion for faculty evaluation: 
[C]ollegiality is not a distinct capacity to be assessed independently of 
the traditional triumvirate of teaching, scholarship, and service.  It is 
rather a quality whose value is expressed in the successful execution 
of these three functions. . . .  The current tendency to isolate 
collegiality as a distinct dimension of evaluation, however, poses 
several dangers.  Historically, “collegiality” has not infrequently been 
associated with ensuring homogeneity, and hence with practices that 
exclude persons on the basis of their difference from a perceived 
norm.  The invocation of “collegiality” may also threaten academic 
freedom. . . .  [C]ollegiality may be confused with the expectation that 
a faculty member display “enthusiasm” or “dedication,” evince “a 
constructive attitude” that will “foster harmony,” or display an 
excessive deference to administrative or faculty decisions where these 
may require reasoned discussion.  Such expectations are flatly 
contrary to elementary principles of academic freedom, which protect 
a faculty member’s right to dissent from the judgments of colleagues 
and administrators.120 
This warning is particularly welcome for a faculty member whose 
reality is not shaded but defined in black and white.  One colleague calls 
 
116. PRICE, supra note 1, at 2–3. 
117. Jennifer Ruark, In Academic Culture, Mental Health Problems Are Hard to Recognize 
and Hard to Treat, CHRON. (Feb. 16, 2010), http://chronicle.com/article/In-Academe-Mental-
Health/64246/ (“Historically, ‘collegial’ has too often been code for ‘just like us[,]’” which can 
drive out otherwise qualified faculty members); PRICE, supra note 1, at 112–17.  
118. PRICE, supra note 1, at 114. 
119. Price notes that there is very little current research on the issue of accommodating mental 
disabilities outside of studies on lawsuits under the ADA.  However, the research that has been 
done seems to indicate that “employees fear asking for accommodation, and when they do ask, 
report being further stigmatized . . . .  This creates . . . a ‘disclosure conundrum’: to obtain 
accommodation, a person with a mental disability must disclose; but the act of disclosure itself 
may bring about stigmatization and retaliation.”  Id. at 118.  
120. On Collegiality as a Criterion for Faculty Evaluation, AAUP (Nov. 1999), http://www. 
aaup.org/AAUP/pubsres/policydocs/contents/collegiality.htm. 
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me an “enigma” because he cannot figure out whether I will support the 
administration from issue to issue.  His reaction is not surprising; I 
support not what the administration wants or does not want, but what I 
think is “right.”  At the same time, however, I am “highly committed to 
[my] organization, driven to succeed, and loyal.”121 
Neither Price nor I suggest that faculty conduct that does not conform 
to institutional norms should be condoned; we ask instead for a 
“clearer” and more “ethical” conceptualization of what those norms 
are.122  Mental illness should not excuse conduct harmful to the 
institution, and I receive mental health treatment for both personal and 
professional reasons to enable me to excel at work.  At the same time, 
colleagues can be “affirming” toward faculty members with “hidden” 
disabilities—in standing by such a colleague under scrutiny or taking 
collective action on behalf of that faculty member (e.g., by writing a 
collaborative memo to the administration).123  A “small gesture or a few 
well-placed words can have enormous impact.”124  “We must 
proliferate our ways of asking for—and listening—for feedback,”125 
which suggests that feedback should be more democratic and go in 
many directions (e.g., faculty-to-faculty, administrator-to-faculty, and 
faculty-to-administrator).  I am evaluated on a yearly basis by my 
academic deans and tenure committee, but I am never given the 
opportunity to evaluate them.  More pointedly, the “shameful statistics 
on employment levels of persons with mental disabilities, the silence 
around mental disability in academe, and our scarcity in faculty 
positions generally, are also feedback, if we pay attention to them.”126 
As Price writes, there is no “one size fits all” for access.127  For 
example, my communication style differs from the “normal-minded”: I 
am direct, honest, and literal; I often miss social cues and nuances; and I 
am an incredibly fast thinker and worker, which is refreshing to some 
colleagues and off-putting to others.  The solution is a structural one—
we need “more democratic systems of communication that make room 
for difference.”128  For example, I am much more comfortable 
communicating by email than in person.129  As Ramona Paetzold 
 
121. Paetzold, supra note 64, at 373. 
122. PRICE, supra note 1, at 115. 
123. Id. at 132. 
124. Id.   
125. Id. at 130 (emphasis added). 
126. Id. at 131. 
127. Id. at 135. 
128. Id. at 116. 
129. Cf. id. at 90 (“For my own frenetic, visual/verbal ways of learning—not to mention my 
anxiety during face-to-face interactions—holding two or three conversations via chat is 
5_DUHL  3/9/2013  1:35 PM 
2013] Over the Borderline 805 
writes, “opening the doors for those with mental illnesses means that 
innovation is required to find ways to alter the work environment to 
embrace them and render them enabled.”130 
III. MAD AT SCHOOL: WHAT MATTERS? 
In Mad at School, Price, with humility and compassion, analyzes the 
rhetoric in academic discourse about mental disabilities.  Her analysis is 
critical to making much-needed progress in higher education toward 
removing stigma and obstacles for academics with mental illness.  In 
addition, law, medicine, and “outsider” narratives—all discussed by 
Price131—offer insights into how we can remove the secrecy and stigma 
surrounding mental illness in legal education. 
A. Rhetoric and Context Matter 
After listening to a social worker talk at our faculty retreat about how 
to work with “difficult” (i.e., mentally ill) people, I could not stand it 
anymore.  I spoke out about how I had been diagnosed with both 
Bipolar Disorder and BPD.  I argued that mentally ill academics 
frequently have tremendous creativity, energy, and drive, and can make 
enormous contributions to educational institutions, often because of 
their illnesses.  Taken off guard, she responded that she was focusing on 
acute disorders, such as anxiety and depression, and not personality 
disorders.  She did not even acknowledge that the symptoms of 
personality disorders are often acute (e.g., panic, depression, mania, 
etc.).  That was my “coming out” to my faculty colleagues, to which 
most responded, “I never would have known.” 
The social worker’s rhetoric did more to stigmatize mental illness 
than to eliminate stigma, in large part because of the context in which 
she spoke—she was the alleged expert on mental illness in the 
workplace.  After the presentation, one of my curmudgeonly colleagues 
came up to me and said, “Greg, I didn’t know you were a nutcase.”  In 
most contexts, such a comment would be insulting and dehumanizing, 
but this colleague made his comment as a sign of support and affection.  
Context matters. 
While writing this Article, Jesse Jackson Jr., the U.S. Representative 
for Illinois’s Second Congressional District, went missing from 
 
considerably more effective and more energy-efficient than holding one oral/aural conference in 
person.”). 
130. Paetzold, supra note 64, at 371. 
131. See PRICE, supra note 1, at 52 (commenting that medical or “other” narratives with 
respect to disability attempt to “cure” through rhetoric).  
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Congress.132  After much speculation, his staff released a statement 
from an unidentified doctor that Jackson was “receiving intensive 
medical treatment at a residential treatment facility for a mood 
disorder,” “responding positively to treatment,” and “expected to make 
a full recovery.”133  His office first announced that he was taking a 
medical leave of absence for “exhaustion.”134  Using “exhaustion” as a 
misnomer for mental illness is stigmatizing; when administrators and 
colleagues tell me they worry about me “burning out” or becoming 
“exhausted,” they are, although well-intentioned, minimizing that my 
illness is part of my mind.  Likewise, the remark that Jackson is 
“expected to make a full recovery” suggests that mental illness can be 
“cured,” a suggestion that both Price and I would agree is rhetorically 
crippling. 
B. Law Matters 
The ADA has largely failed academics with mental illness.135  These 
academics cannot prove that they have a “disability,” that they are 
“otherwise qualified” to perform the “essential functions” of the job, or 
that their accommodations are “reasonable.”136  While some 
commentators have called for courts to interpret the ADA more 
broadly,137 the problem is with the ADA itself.  Kathleen Zylan notes: 
Perhaps in an effort to combat fears of overinclusiveness by covering 
the mentally ill under the ADA, Congress drafted an ambiguous 
statute that has undoubtedly led to economic waste in the form of 
increased litigation and employment costs as employers and courts 
wade through the nebulous language.  These ambiguities are 
particularly troublesome when claims are based on mental disability 
rather than physical disability because the nature of mental illness 
lends itself to more speculation and less confidence in the veracity of 
the claim of disability.  This lack of precision in diagnosis of a mental 
disorder, coupled with the ambiguities in the language of the ADA, 
 
132. Kate Bolduan & Deidre Walsh, Rep. Jesse Jackson Jr. Being Treated for Mood Disorder, 
Statement Says, CNN (July 11, 2012), http://articles.cnn.com/2012-07-11/politics/politics_ 
congress-jackson-absence_1_jackson-bipolar-mood-disorder. 
133. Id. 
134. Abdon M. Pallasch & Lynn Sweet, Jesse Jackson Jr. Takes Medical Leave for 
‘Exhaustion,’ CHI. SUN-TIMES, (June 25, 2012, 5:36 PM), http://www.suntimes.com/news/ 
politics/13408948-418/us-rep-jesse-jackson-jr-takes-medical-leave-for-exhaustion.html. 
135. See supra note 55 and accompanying text (citing scholarly examples of the ADA’s 
shortcomings). 
136. See supra notes 55−74 and accompanying text (discussing the difficulty that mentally 
impaired faculty have in bringing successful ADA claims). 
137. See, e.g., Paetzold, supra note 64, at 363−82 (suggesting that courts should expand their 
ADA interpretations to include mental disabilities). 
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also provides difficulties for employers when making employment 
decisions.  Thus, the ADA fails not only the employees, but also the 
employers.138 
We need to advocate for laws and regulations that do not clutch to a 
definition of “disability” more suited for those with physical 
impairments, but that cover mental illness more broadly and explicitly, 
including specific illnesses and symptoms.  Likewise, we need to think 
of “accommodations” more broadly.  For example, the Job 
Accommodation Network suggests that supervisors can do the 
following for employees with mental health impairments: 
• Provide positive praise and reinforcement, 
• Provide day-to-day guidance and feedback, 
• Provide written job instructions via email, 
• Develop clear expectations of responsibilities and the 
consequences of not meeting performance standards, 
• Schedule consistent meetings with employee to set goals and 
review progress, 
• Allow for open communication, 
• Establish written long term and short term goals, 
• Develop strategies to deal with conflict, 
• Develop a procedure to evaluate the effectiveness of the 
accommodation, 
• Educate all employees on their right to accommodations, 
• Provide sensitivity training to coworkers and supervisors, 
• Do not mandate that employees attend work-related social 
functions, and 
• Encourage all employees to move non-work-related conversations 
out of work areas.139 
“Mad” faculty members should also encourage their academic 
institutions to adopt policies for faculty members with mental and 
physical impairments.  I was surprised that many institutions, including 
my own, do not have such policies.  Two leading higher education 
lawyers advise educational institutions, “If your institution has a policy 
for dealing with faculty or staff disabilities, consult that first.  If your 
institution has no such policy, it should develop one immediately.”140  
Similarly, the American Association of University Professors wrote, 
“Most institutions have well-developed procedures for managing the 
 
138. Zylan, supra note 55, at 80−81 (footnotes omitted). 
139. BETH LOY, ACCOMMODATION AND COMPLIANCE SERIES: EMPLOYEES WITH MENTAL 
HEALTH IMPAIRMENTS, JOB ACCOMMODATION NETWORK 10 (2011), available at https://askjan. 
org/media/downloads/PsychiatricA&CSeries.pdf. 
140. LEE & RUGER, supra note 114, at 16.  
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needs of students who have disabilities.  Procedures for managing 
faculty accommodation requests, while used less frequently, are equally 
important.”141 
In this area, the “outsider” narrative is particularly important because 
academic institutions can provide greater clarity and certainty than the 
ADA and better support and protection for impaired faculty members.  
While this can benefit “mad” faculty members, it can also benefit 
educational institutions.  As Ramona Paetzold wrote: 
Ironically, employers can benefit from employees with BPD during 
those hypomanic periods when they tend to be goal-directed, more 
creative, and requiring little sleep, particularly if facilitated by 
surrounding conditions.  It would simply be unfair (and societally 
unwise) to eliminate such employees if they then exhibit temporary 
behavioral or performance limitations . . . .  [O]pening the doors for 
those with mental illnesses means that innovation is required to find 
ways to alter the work environment to embrace them and render them 
enabled.142 
Paetzold explicitly makes room for the narrative of faculty who 
contribute to academic institutions because of their mental impairments. 
C. Medical Treatment Matters 
In February 2012, I was preparing for a consultation with one of the 
country’s leading psychiatrists on pharmacological treatments for BPD.  
I read his latest research, which suggested that carbamazepine—which I 
took at the time—was ineffective for treating BPD and that Topomax 
had been proven effective.  I met with him, and after talking to me for 
an hour, he advised me that the Topomax trials were not relevant to me, 
and I should stay on carbamazepine.  I started seeing a new psychiatrist 
two months later, and she took me off of the carbamazepine and put me 
on Lamictal, yet a third mood stabilizer. 
Despite the pronouncement that the “revisions of [the] DSM have 
represented an increasing adherence to a model of disability as a 
measurable and biological phenomenon,”143 the diagnosis and treatment 
 
141. AM. ASS’N OF UNIV. PROFESSORS, ACCOMMODATING FACULTY MEMBERS WHO HAVE 
DISABILITIES 2–3 (2012), available at http://www.aaup.org/NR/rdonlyres/49CCE979-73DF-
4AF4-96A2-10B2F111EFBA/0/Disabilities.pdf%203 (footnotes omitted).  See also Faculty & 
Staff Assistance Program, UNIV. OF MICH., http://www.umich.edu/~fasap/ (last visited Feb. 11, 
2013); Faculty & Staff Assistance Program, JOHNS HOPKINS UNIV., http://www.jhu.edu/~hr1/ 
fasap/fasap.htm (last modified Sept. 20, 2010).  But see DARTMOUTH COLL., DARTMOUTH 
EMPLOYEE HANDBOOK (2011), available at http://www.dartmouth.edu/~hrs/handbook/dartmouth 
_employee_handbook.pdf (providing no mention of assistance for faculty members with mental 
illness). 
142. Paetzold, supra note 64, at 371. 
143. PRICE, supra note 1, at 34. 
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of mental illness is subjective and imprecise.144  As my experience 
above shows, psychotropic medications are not “magic bullets” that can 
erase or cure mental illness.145  Indeed, psychiatrists cannot even agree 
on the most effective medication for treating any particular illness or 
symptom.  Likewise, non-medicinal treatment recommendations for 
BPD include such widely different treatments as Dialectical Behavior 
Therapy,146 Schema Focused Therapy,147 Mentalization Based 
Therapy,148 and Transference Focused Psychotherapy.149 
However, we should not jump to the conclusions that medicine and 
science are arbitrary or do not matter to individuals with mental illness.  
Different medications and treatments have good outcomes for 
individuals with BPD;150 the frustration is that no medication or 
treatment works for everyone.151  Price contemplates “a [psychiatric] 
 
144. See Moses & Barlow, supra note 32, at 147 (discussing possible reasons why these types 
of diagnoses are so subjective and imprecise).   
145. See PRICE, supra note 1, at 110–11 (“Suggesting that a person’s mental disability 
effectively disappears with the application of medication is as absurd as suggesting that his 
hearing disability disappeared because he uses hearing aids . . . .”). 
146. Dialectical Based Therapy (“DBT”) focuses on recognizing and balancing opposite 
emotions and behavioral tensions.  MARSHA M. LINEHAN, COGNITIVE-BEHAVIORAL TREATMENT 
OF BORDERLINE PERSONALITY DISORDER 201 (1993).  
147. Schema Focused Therapy helps a person confront childhood memories and experiences.  
PAUL M. SALKOVSKIS, FRONTIERS OF COGNITIVE THERAPY 187 (1996). 
148. Mentalization Based Therapy helps the patient focus on his or her own mental states, 
including feelings and desires, as well as those of others.  ANTHONY W. BATEMAN & PETER 
FONAGY, HANDBOOK OF MENTALIZING IN MENTAL HEALTH PRACTICE 67–68 (2011). 
149. Transference Focused Psychotherapy uses aspects of the client-therapist relationship in 
order to address BPD symptoms.  JOHN F. CLARKIN ET AL., PSYCHOTHERAPY FOR BORDERLINE 
PERSONALITY: FOCUSING ON OBJECT RELATIONS 242 (2006).  
150. See What is DBT?, BEHAVIORAL TECH, LLC, http://behavioraltech.org/resources/ 
whatisdbt.cfm/ (last visited July 19, 2012) (describing two randomized controlled trials of DBT 
that indicated that DBT is more effective than Treatment-As-Usual (TAU) in treatment of both 
BPD and treatment of BPD and comorbid diagnosis of substance abuse).  Furthermore, the trial 
demonstrated that: 
Clients receiving DBT, compared to TAU, were significantly less likely to drop out of 
therapy, were significantly less likely to engage in parasuicide, reported significantly 
fewer parasuicidal behaviors and, when engaging in parasuicidal behaviors, had less 
medically severe behaviors.  Further, clients receiving DBT were less likely to be 
hospitalized, had fewer days in hospital, and had higher scores on global and social 
adjustment. 
Id. 
151. Authors Western and Bradley discuss this type of difficulty with respect to treating BPD: 
The empirically supported therapies movement is predicated on the assumption that 
most patients either have, or can be treated as if they have, one primary syndrome, for 
which a single treatment package can be designed.  Without this assumption, 
researchers would need to test dozens of manuals to address all the possible 
interactions among disorders for even a handful of common disorders (e.g., the 
interaction of major depression and panic disorder, of major depression and substance 
abuse, or of major depression and both panic and substance abuse).  This assumption is 
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profession that is less coercive and more democratic, one that includes 
not only its practitioners but also its ‘patients’ as important and 
powerful voices.”152  “Patients” are their own agents and should be 
heard by their mental health providers to enable full participation by the 
mentally ill in their own treatment. 
D. Conclusion: Narrative Matters 
Many law students experience what I did—they have acute 
symptoms of mental illness manifesting themselves for the first time in 
law school.153  Students often must cope with their illnesses in secrecy 
and isolation; there are no student organizations for the mentally ill as 
there are for other “outsider” groups, and the student who “comes out” 
faces stigma and employment obstacles.154  As Jennifer Jolly-Ryan 
 
not inherent in the use of randomized controlled trials; indeed, it is precisely what 
distinguishes randomized controlled trials in the empirically supported therapies era 
from randomized controlled trials in the past, which often used mixed patient samples. 
Drew Western & Rebekah Bradley, Empirically Supported Complexity, Rethinking Evidence-
Based Practice in Psychotherapy, 15 CURRENT DIRECTIONS IN PSYCHOL. SCI. 266, 268 (2006). 
152. PRICE, supra note 1, at 36. 
153. See, e.g., Kirsten A. Dauphinais, Sea Change: The Seismic Shift in the Legal Profession 
and How Legal Writing Professors Will Keep Legal Education Afloat in Its Wake, 10 SEATTLE J. 
FOR SOC. JUST. 49, 112−13 (2011) (describing a 1986 study that Andrew Benjamin and 
colleagues conducted investigating the incidence of mental illness among law students).  The 
study revealed that: 
[T]he instances of psychiatric problems spiked significantly for first-year law students 
and then through law school and for two years after graduation.  Many students in law 
school report loss of self-esteem and alienation as a result of the law school setting.  
They also report feeling pressure to lay aside their values in law school.  Professor 
Hess reports that these feelings are even more prevalent in female and minority 
students. 
Id. (footnotes omitted).  See generally Jennifer Jolly-Ryan, The Last Taboo: Breaking Law 
Students with Mental Illness and Disabilities Out of the Stigma Straitjacket, 79 UMKC L. REV. 
123, 144 (2010) (“Many law students begin their legal education with little or no signs of mental 
impairment such as depression or anxiety.  But due to the nature of a legal education . . . 
depression and anxiety may develop.”); Robert P. Schuwerk, The Law Professor as Fiduciary: 
What Duties Do We Owe to Our Students?, 45 S. TEX. L. REV. 753, 764−66 (2003) (arguing that 
most law school faculty are unaware of the rise in the amount of “literature documenting the 
extreme levels of mental illness and substance abuse that develop among law students while in 
law school . . . .  Many of those who are familiar with this body of work either do not believe that 
it is true or else attribute it to [other] causes”); Kevin H. Smith, Disabilities, Law Schools, and 
Law Students: A Proactive and Holistic Approach, 32 AKRON L. REV. 1, 28 (1999) (“A student 
who coped well with the stress of undergraduate studies may find herself affected for the first 
time when faced with the chronic and generally greater stress of law school.”).  
154. Jolly-Ryan hypothesizes a reason for this fear of stigmatization:  
Law students do not want to chance jeopardizing their future careers.  Law students 
with mental illnesses, disorders, or disabilities may fear that disclosure will make them 
ineligible to sit for the bar exam.  One author notes that “[t]here are many disincentives 
within the legal community for a person to admit that they have a problem.  One such 
disincentive is that if a law student discloses that they are receiving treatment . . . [for a 
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notes: 
Ironically, the very people who are in the best position to increase the 
number of lawyers who intimately understand the discrimination and 
health care laws in our society impose some of the highest hurdles to 
employment and educational opportunities.  Lawyers stigmatize and 
often decline to hire other lawyers unless they have a clean mental 
health history—free of disabilities, disorders, and illnesses.155 
Narratives open up opportunities for mentoring156 and community157 
among the mentally ill in legal education and can begin to break down 
the secrecy, isolation, and stigma experienced by those with mental 
illness. 
Yet, any acknowledgement of mental illness can be “dangerous,”158 
leading to the same isolation and stigma that “outsider” narratives can 
combat.  Academics who commit to writing narratives about mental 
illness often back out.159  Out of fear, I have stopped writing this Article 
many times.  Narrative has no power in secrecy, however, and like 
Margaret Price, James Jones, and Ellen Saks, I have decided to share 
my own. 
 
 
mental disease] they will not be allowed to take the bar exam.”  Therefore, the decision 
to self-identify as a student with mental or emotional issues and to seek any help from 
mental health professionals is a difficult one. 
Jolly-Ryan, supra note 153, at 129 (quoting Carol M. Langford, Depression, Substance Abuse, 
and Intellectual Property Lawyers, 53 U. KAN. L. REV. 875, 900 (2005) (footnotes omitted)). 
155. Jolly-Ryan, supra note 153, at 123−24. 
156. Cf. PRICE, supra note 1, at 138−40 (discussing mentoring). 
157. Id. at 19−20 (“In my own experience, claiming disability has been a journey of 
community, power, and love.”). 
158. Id. at 131. 
159. Id.  
